Origin and Concentration: Corporate Ownership, Control and Performance

Hanousek, Jan; Kočenda, Evžen; Švejnar, Jan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.733143

Cited by 51 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Since there are very few studies that use a homogenous measure of performance, we have 13 Alternatively, other suitable techniques such as difference in difference estimator and matching-type estimator can be employed, provided that adequate data are available. 14 For a more detailed discussion of the results of these studies, see Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar (2007), which contains detailed tables listing region, time period, performance measure, types of ownership, and resulting effects separately for each available study from the CEE, CIS and China.…”

Section: The Effects Of Privatization On the Performance Of Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects Of Privatization And Ownership In Transition Economies

Estrin¹,

Hanousek²,

Kočenda³

et al. 2009

Policy Research Working Papers

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The paper evaluates the effects of privatization in the post-communist economies and China. In postcommunist economies privatization to foreign owners results in a rapid improvement in performance of firms, while performance effects of privatization to domestic owners are less impressive and vary across regions, coinciding with differences in policies and institutional development. In China relatively more estimates suggest that privatization to domestic owners improves the level of performance. Concentrated private ownership has a stronger positive effect on performance than dispersed ownership in the post-communist economies, but foreign joint ventures rather than wholly owned foreign firms have a positive effect in China. Worker or collective ownership does not have a negative effect. In the postcommunist economies new firms are equally or more efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners, and foreign start-ups are more efficient than domestic ones. Privatization is not associated with lower employment. When accompanied by complementary reforms, privatization has a positive effect on economic growth. Three factors appear to drive the more positive effect of privatization to foreign than domestic owners. Domestic managers have more limited skills and access to world markets, domestically privatized firms have been more subject to tunneling and in some countries new large shareholders artificially decreased performance. The important policy implication is that privatization per se does not guarantee improved performance, at least not in the short-to medium-run. Type of private ownership, corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, and the legal and institutional system matter for firm performance.

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Section: The Effects Of Privatization On the Performance Of Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects Of Privatization And Ownership In Transition Economies

Estrin¹,

Hanousek²,

Kočenda³

et al. 2009

Policy Research Working Papers

Self Cite

249

341

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our claim is based on the evidence shown in Tables 7 and 8. In Table 7, we examine the relationship between estimates of ownership types and research quality using 21 With respect to this finding, we must note that it is possible that an ultimate owner of some banks and investment funds is the state- Kočenda (1999) showed that the state was able to effectively control the banking sector even after bank privatization, and Hanousek et al (2007) showed that this lasted until 2001. However, there is insufficient information in the extant literature to enable us to distinguish financial institutions under state control from others.…”

Section: Panel (B) Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They all differ in terms of their restructuring capability in the post-privatization period and exhibit different degrees of comparative superiority (or inferiority). In this respect, we review several key ownership types: the state, domestic or foreign industrial (i.e., non-financial) companies, banks, investment funds, portfolio companies, and individual owners; insiders have not been important in the Czech Republic (Hanousek et al, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are some owners better than others in Czech privatized firms? Even meta-analysis can’t make us perfectly sure

Iwasaki

Kočenda

2017

Economic Systems

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Abstract:We use a total of 1171 estimates extracted from 34 previous studies and perform a metaanalysis to examine the relationship between ownership structures and firm performance in the Czech mass-privatized firms. We find that, in contrast to the remarkable effect of foreign ownership on firm performance and restructuring activities, domestic private entities were incapable of outperforming the state as owners of Czech companies. Our assessment of publication selection bias, however, indicates that the collected estimates do not contain genuine evidence for many types of corporate ownership. Further development and improvement in this study area are necessary to capture the true effect. Finally, we also point at the importance to draw (meta-analysis) inferences based on studies that employ adequate methodology.

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“…Hanousek et al (2007), Bena and Hanousek (2008), Dragotă et al (2013) DCIS Dummy variable for target company with few important shareholders (target companies with one or more shareholders having more than 33% but not more than 50% of the target's equity) (1 if the company is in this situation, 0 otherwise). Hanousek et al (2007), Bena and Hanousek (2008), Dragotă et al (2013) DCDO Dummy variable for target company with a diversified ownership (no shareholder owns more than 33%) (1 if the company is in this situation, 0 otherwise). Hanousek et al (2007), Bena and Hanousek (2008), Dragotă et al (2013) …”

Section: Dcmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hanousek et al (2007), Bena and Hanousek (2008), Dragotă et al (2013) DCDO Dummy variable for target company with a diversified ownership (no shareholder owns more than 33%) (1 if the company is in this situation, 0 otherwise). Hanousek et al (2007), Bena and Hanousek (2008), Dragotă et al (2013) …”

Section: Dcmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania

Dragotă¹,

Ciobanu²

2017

Prague Economic Papers

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Most of the studies regarding control premium are focussed on the case in which it is positive. We considered the case when it is negative, investigating the determinants of the discount for control, having as study case the Romanian listed companies. Comparative to the general case of control premium, discounts for control are also determined by some other specific factors, like the number of non-trading days and the cash ratio. Some determinant factors of control premium have an opposite influence when this is negative: the percentage of shares purchased in the transaction, the ownership concentration, the fact the buyer or the seller is domestic, and the existence of a major shareholder owning more than 50% of shares. Consequently, some factors usually used in explaining the control premium cannot be suitably used for the case of the discount for control. Moreover, the negative impact of the undiversified portfolio is validated.

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Origin and Concentration: Corporate Ownership, Control and Performance

Cited by 51 publications

References 46 publications

Effects Of Privatization And Ownership In Transition Economies

Effects Of Privatization And Ownership In Transition Economies

Are some owners better than others in Czech privatized firms? Even meta-analysis can’t make us perfectly sure

The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania

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