Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress

Abstract

In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.

Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives

“…Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) and Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) examine that to what extent lobby groups tend to approach legislators with similar versus different predispositions in an issue. Langbein (1986) and Wright (1990) provide evidence that money can buy access to legislators, but does not directly influence legislators, suggesting that it is information from the interest group that can shift a legislator's position.…”

Chapter 9 Lobbying of Commercial Diplomats: Institutional Setting as a Determining Factor

“…Lobbying is defined as a strategic activity of providing information to legislators (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998;McGrath, 2007), 'contacting government officials or elected politicians to influence their decisions on matters of interest' (Mack, 2005, p. 340). Ihlen and Berntzen (2007) define it as 'influencing political decision-making in the interest of a group by communicating with publics relevant to the political process of a certain issue ' (p. 236).…”

“…Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande, Krishna, & Robbins, 2006;Gawande, Maloney, & Montes-Rojas, 2009;Husted, 1991;Kee, Olarreaga, & Silva, 2007;Panke, 2012;Vining et al, 2005). Lobbying plays an important role as it can shape the decisions that are taken, make sure that a status quo prevails and influence the attitudes of decision-makers by moulding the political agenda (Baron & Hirsch, 2012;Gawande et al, 2009;Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998;Svendsen, 2011). The pursuit of economic benefits is usually the reason for lobbying (Crosby & Orsini, 1996;Mack, 2005).…”

“…The lobbyists can disseminate to the relevant decision-makers' informational materials containing different technical data and arguments (Gawande et al, 2009;Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011). They can provide information about the positive and negative consequences of the decision or measure to be taken, or even draft legislation or amendments (Heitshusen, 2000;Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). In this way the lobbyists can mould the point of views of decisionmakers in their favour.…”

“…A lobbying group should monitor what is going on in the relevant government ministries. It is important to meet regularly, formally and informally with the decision-makers (Haug & Koppang, 1997;Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998;Mack, 2005). The ability to have frequent meetings with the decision-makers is essential for successful lobbying (Hamada, 2007, Nownes & DeAlejandro, 2009).…”