Organizational Challenges to Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance

Silbey, Susan S.

doi:10.1177/0002716213493066

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Most recently, in the world of finance, the Great Recession of 2008 has fostered considerable debate on whether it was caused by a lack of oversight by federal regulatory agencies in the marketplace. Now there is concern about whether increased regulation is excessive and whether an unregulated "marketplace" is the most efficient model for fostering the common good (Silbey 2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Regulating California’s Prison Population

Austin¹

2016

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Scie

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While many scholars and social commentators bemoan the rise of “mass incarceration” in the United States, few states have succeeded in significantly reducing prison populations. Fueled by systemic changes in penal codes, sentencing practices, and federal funding all designed to increase the use of imprisonment, most states have been unable to reverse the massive increase that has transpired over the past four decades. More alarming, there are few indications that mass incarceration will be reduced any time soon. There are a few exceptions, with California being one. Since 2007, California’s prison population has dropped by over 43,000 prisoners. Reductions have also been achieved in the state parole (82,000) and probation (15,000) populations. Today there are 146,000 fewer Californians in prison, jail, parole, or probation. Initially driven largely by a period of lengthy litigation, a rare federal court order to depopulate, several other reforms, reflecting a sticks and carrots approach, were introduced beginning in 2007 to lower imprisonment rates. Among them was “Realignment,” which relocated approximately 27,000 state prisoners to the counties. However, it required another stick in the form of a ballot initiative (Proposition 47) to further reduce the prison population and meet compliance with the federal court order. In the end, it was the externally imposed dual “sticks” of litigation and a ballot initiative that proved to be the driving forces in reducing California’s use of mass incarceration.

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confidence: 99%

Regulating California’s Prison Population

Austin¹

2016

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Scie

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“…Unwanted behaviour is prohibited/dissuaded, while desirable decisions are encouraged/mandated (BRTF, 2007). Regulations vary by jurisdiction, but in developed economies they generally cover everything from who can be employed and on what terms, to the way buildings are designed/constructed, and even to the way food is grown/prepared/sold (Silbey, 2013).…”

Section: Micro-firms and Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Owner–manager perceptions of regulation and micro-firm performance: An exploratory view

Betton

Branston

Tomlinson

2020

Competition & Change

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Regulation has traditionally been explored in terms of its negative burden on financial performance. We posit a true assessment should consider both its burden and value, as well as financial and wider performance criteria. This hypothesis is explored in the context of micro-firms using original survey data from the English tourism industry, using multivariate regression techniques and qualitative comments. Perceived-Burden demonstrates a negative association with financial performance, while Perceived-Value demonstrates a positive association with goal-satisfaction. Resulting policy recommendations focus on accompanying future regulatory changes with appropriate positive information so managers can move beyond burden to recognize the inherent value, and suggesting the need for further research in this area.

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“…Moreover, the price tag for successful regulation has often been lower than anticipated. Some observers have advocated more systematic analysis of these regulatory victories alongside the setbacks and defeats, charging that sociolegal scholars have “misdirected our attention” (Silbey 2013, p. 12) and “systematically misstated and underestimated” (Sarat 1985, p. 29) the power of law and regulation. Exemplifying this more balanced approach, a recent edited volume (Coglianese 2017) presented a cornucopia of ideas about what regulatory excellence is and how to achieve and measure it.…”

Section: Introduction: Why Regulatory Success Is Hard To Seementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Building in regulatory hardware and firmware makes regulation more durable, more automatic, and self‐enforcing, 1 but also less visible. Once they are woven into “the very fabric of our lives” (Silbey 2013, p. 11), we neither see these regulatory artifacts nor note their legal origins. Hardware may require a very substantial initial investment – sunk costs – and ongoing spending for replacement, repairs, and routine maintenance.…”

Section: Introduction: Why Regulatory Success Is Hard To Seementioning

confidence: 99%

Subterranean successes: Durable regulation and regulatory endowments

Heimer

Kuo

2021

Regulation & Governance

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Scholars sometimes criticize durable regulatory systems for being costly, inefficient, ineffective, and inequitable. This article reassesses regulation, arguing that a mis‐categorization of types of regulatory activity has led critics astray. More specifically, the article observes that regulation “hardened” by being built into infrastructure often ceases to be seen as regulation and its benefits are therefore inappropriately omitted from assessments of regulatory accomplishments. Hardening into one or another durable form can create two important benefits: durable regulation moves some items off the agenda of regulators, conserving resources for other regulatory work; durable regulation also creates regulatory endowments, preserving key bargains struck at the time infrastructure was created and reducing future opportunities for capture. Such endowments can then become the foundation for other regulatory work. Examples from the regulation of drinking water in the United States and brief discussions of road safety and disability regulation illustrate the argument.

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Organizational Challenges to Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance

Cited by 11 publications

References 20 publications

Regulating California’s Prison Population

Regulating California’s Prison Population

Owner–manager perceptions of regulation and micro-firm performance: An exploratory view

Subterranean successes: Durable regulation and regulatory endowments

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