2020
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03803-5
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Ordering and inventory reallocation decisions in a shared inventory platform with demand information sharing

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2022
2022
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 35 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Paul and Chowdhury (2020) stated that collaborating and sharing resources among manufacturers increases the service level. However, when this mechanism is based on individual profit and loss, supply chain partners can share fake information (Xu et al, 2020). Therefore, this strategy cannot be implemented in the absence of a high level of trust.…”
Section: Discussion and Managerial Insightsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Paul and Chowdhury (2020) stated that collaborating and sharing resources among manufacturers increases the service level. However, when this mechanism is based on individual profit and loss, supply chain partners can share fake information (Xu et al, 2020). Therefore, this strategy cannot be implemented in the absence of a high level of trust.…”
Section: Discussion and Managerial Insightsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Karabuk and Wu (2005) study the capacity allocation problem within a firm and explore bonus payments schemes that align incentives. More recently, Xu et al (2020) investigate the optimal ordering and inventory reallocation decisions of a platform based on retailer demand information sharing, and propose a punishment mechanism to encourage truthful sharing. We focus instead on the potential of allocation mechanisms as a tool to align incentives and encourage retailers to report their true demands.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, because the central planner does not have access to local demand information, they must rely on retail orders to inform his allocation decision (see also Özen et al 2008). This implies the possibility that retailers may receive either less or more than they ordered, depending on the total quantity of order requests relative to available inventory (as in Xu et al 2020), and hence, may have an incentive to either inflate or deflate their needs. Compared with interactions across firms, the possibility of retailers receiving more than they requested may seem somewhat surprising.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%