Order effects on children's moral and achievement judgments.

Moral Reasoning in Young Children: A Review of Research into Intentionality and Implications for Education

“…damage) outcomes. This finding was replicated by Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes and Ruble (1976).…”

“…In response to stimulus sequences, young children tend to be particularly sensitive to the final items of information presented, whereas older children and adults generally react strongly to both the initial and final items. Research by Austin, Ruble and Trabasso (1977), Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes and Ruble (1976), Gottlieb, Taylor and Ruderman (1977), Nummedal and Bass (1976) and Parsons, Ruble, Klosson, Feldman and Rholes (1976) clearly support the thesis that young children's moral decisions are biased by the information (i.e. damage or motives) received last.…”

Separable effects of motives, consequences, and presentation order on children's moral judgments.

“…By analyzing individual children's data, Grueneich (in press) also concluded that there is a developmental increase in the use of both cues. In contrast, Parsons et al (1976) and Feldman et al (1976) concluded that even kindergartners combined motive and consequence information, and that presentation order was only one variable influencing the effect of motives on moral 257 judgments. Austin et al (1977) found no differences between 6-and 8-year-olds in either the use of motives or the effects of order of presentation.…”

“…One study used story pairs (Austin et al, 1977) while other studies presented single stories Nummedal & Bass, 1976;Parsons et al, 1976), and Grueneich (in press) presented both. One study assured that the children were able to remember the stories prior to judgment (Austin et al, 1977) and another tested memory after the judgment , whereas other studies apparently did not assure memory for the stimuli .…”

“…Requests for reprints should be sent to Colleen F. Surber, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin,Madison,Wisconsin S3706. of the moral dilemmas presented (Gutkin, 1972), the valence of the consequence information (Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farmil, 1973), the salience of intentionality information (Bearison & Isaacs, 1975), potential justifications for one's acts (Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978;Hewitt^ 1975), and the order in which motive and consequence information is,presented (Austin, Ruble, & Trabasso, 1977;Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes, & Ruble, 1976;Grueneich, in press;Nummedal & Bass, 1976;Parsons, Ruble, Chereskin, Feldman, & Rholes, 1976).…”