Oran Young and international institutions

Mitchell, Ronald B.

doi:10.1007/s10784-012-9200-3

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(42 reference statements)

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“…We grouped the factors into three general categories, namely economic interests, geopolitics (security interests), and cultural distance (historical and personal ties). These are the variables of interest to governance regime scholars (see (Mitchell, 2013) for a review of the literature). It might be the case that there are other factors at play, but these are reasonable starting points for our analysis.…”

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea

Orazgaliyev

Araral

2019

International Journal of the Commons

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The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal fisheries, community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture. We focus on conflict and cooperation in the Caspian Sea-a global commons-involving five claimant countries as well as interests of major powers (the United States, European Union, and China). Building on the work of Stern and Young on the study of conflict and cooperation in global commons, we model the case as a prisoner's dilemma game with the two different outcomes. In the North Caspian Sea, competing claimant countries-Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan-have agreed to cooperate and solve their differences over ownership of oil fields. In contrast, claimants in the South Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan-have failed to cooperate despite decades of trying. Using analytic narratives, we suggest that politics (or strategic calculations) could help explain these two different outcomes. In making these calculations, countries will act in their rational self-interest, given the prospects of international anarchy. We suggest that this realist account can be partly explained by the convergence of economic interests, geopolitics, and cultural distance. We argue that the study of global commons would benefit from understanding realist theories of international relations.

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Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea

Orazgaliyev

Araral

2019

International Journal of the Commons

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“…Table 1 displays the treatment and control groups (former difference) to be considered in the DD estimations. We considered four categories of treatment to assess the distinct implemented levels of KP as an international institution (Mitchell 2013;Keohane 1988;Underdal and Young 1997), based upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) base text of the KP (UN 1998) and the Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual (UNFCCC 2008). Firstly (a), we assess the effect of the early intention to participate in the KP, based upon the signature of the Convention's text from March 1998 to March 1999 and its posterior ratification (UNFCCC 2021a).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our first hypothesis considers that the distinct implemented levels of KP were important to alleviate the trend of emissions in the respective groups over the period (Keohane 1984;Young 2013). Our second hypothesis concerns that cooperation with KP goals is influenced by domestic institutions (Mitchell 2013;Martin and Simmons 1998;Cortell and Davis 1996). We employed a differencein-difference statistical approach (Lechner 2010) to retrieve the isolated effect of KP to test the first hypothesis; and considered three indicators of domestic institutional quality, built by Kuncic (2013), in the model estimation to account for the second one.…”

Section: -25mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Concerning international cooperation to mitigate pollutant emissions, such as GHG, countries can attempt to free-ride instead of complying, because cooperation is not solely dependent on "human motivations" (e.g., altruism, idealism, honor ), nor only explained by rational choices (e.g., benefit-cost, optimization) (Keohane 1988;Sandler and Arce 2003). Moreover, free riding is possible because the benefits are shared, while the costs are individualized (Young 2013), and sovereign parties seeking different goals and priorities are embedded in the international arena, which network implies that every party is interdependent of the other (Keohane 1984;Mitchell 2013;Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). As a consequence, one of the difficulties lies in setting the responsibilities that each country would bear, since countries' capabilities to mitigate emissions also differ (Adger et al 2003;Paavola and Adger 2005;Jänicke 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Domestic institutional quality and the effectiveness of global Greenhouse gases mitigation

Tateishi

Bragagnolo

2021

Rev. Carta Inter.

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This study addressed the effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol (KP) as an international institution and the interplay of domestic institutions and KP by employing a difference-in-difference estimation. The results indicated low effectiveness, in general, but not ineffectiveness. Regarding the KP, not only its formal and defined rules but also the demonstration of the intention to cooperate was bound to influence emissions’ reduction. Domestic institutions were more influential than the effects of KP international institution. However, political, legal rights, and economic institutional qualities presented distinct effects over emissions’ mitigation.

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“…Not least because of the influence of the International Human Dimensions Program on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), the empirical focus widened to institutional effects and effectiveness (e.g., Miles et al 2002). International environmental institutions were thought to influence human behavior as not only utility modifiers and enhancers of cooperation, i.e., helping overcome diverging interests, but also as offering legitimacy bases in bestowing authority and facilitating learning (Mitchell 2013). Analytically, GEG scholars began to acknowledge the critical role of a wide set of public and private actors at different levels of International regimes may reduce transaction costs, build trust, and support learning, all of which could help overcome initial conflicts.…”

Section: Global Environmental Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Governing global telecoupling toward environmental sustainability

Newig¹,

Challies²,

Cotta³

et al. 2020

E&S

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Telecoupling constitutes a particular class of globalized environmental issues that are neither local-cumulative, nor transboundary, nor concerning global commons, but that arise because of specific linkages between distal regions. Such telecoupled issues, e.g., associated with global commodity chains, waste flows, or migration patterns, have been receiving increasing attention from scholars of global land change science. Although governance research has mostly studied existing institutional responses to these issues, telecoupling opens up a problem-oriented perspective on issues of environmental sustainability that occur regionally, but that arise because of global linkages, and raises novel questions about how such issues are and could be governed in a global architecture. We draw insights from existing literature on globally interconnected phenomena to advance our understanding of governing telecoupling toward environmental sustainability. We first identify and discuss five particular challenges that telecoupling poses to global environmental governance: knowledge deficits, divergent interests, high transaction costs of cooperation, the weak legitimacy base of current governance arrangements, and policy incoherence and fragmentation. Second, we review conceptual literature that meaningfully address the governance of telecoupling, while utilizing differing terminologies, for example, through reference to "flows," "chains," or "multiscalar" issues. Building on this, we elaborate on how currently debated governance approaches respond to the identified challenges. We conclude with a brief note on where we believe the discussion on governance of telecoupling stands, and where we see directions for future research.

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Oran Young and international institutions

Cited by 12 publications

References 61 publications

Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea

Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea

Domestic institutional quality and the effectiveness of global Greenhouse gases mitigation

Governing global telecoupling toward environmental sustainability

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