2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2016.10.028
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Optimizing power system investments and resilience against attacks

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Cited by 117 publications
(80 citation statements)
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“…focus on a resilience assessment of power systems with respect to hurricanes [18]. A methodology for determining optimal power systems investment for building resilience is presented in [19]. A framework for load restoration in the utility grid is proposed in [6], and strategies for modeling large-scale energy infrastructure from a resilience perspective have been explored in the literature [20].…”
Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…focus on a resilience assessment of power systems with respect to hurricanes [18]. A methodology for determining optimal power systems investment for building resilience is presented in [19]. A framework for load restoration in the utility grid is proposed in [6], and strategies for modeling large-scale energy infrastructure from a resilience perspective have been explored in the literature [20].…”
Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Under cyber attacks, e.g., by contagion of malware, security-related system features may result to be compromised and, the system safety and security potentially endangered. The identification of the cyber threats most affecting the system response is quite important for decision-making on optimal protection and resilience, as prevention and mitigation of malicious attacks contribute to guaranteeing CPS integrity and functionality [67,79,196,209].…”
Section: Safety and Security Of Cyber-physical Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The results were not alarming as they showed good safety margins of the Swiss grid: no unstable conditions emerged from the attack on the most critical substation (hub), the effect of cascading failures was very small, and transmission lines were overloaded in only a few scenarios. Recently, planner-attacker-defender models are adopted to develop decisions that co-optimize investment/operating costs and functionality loss after attacks against power systems (Fang and Sansavini 2017). The model bridges long-term system planning for transmission expansion and short-term switching operations in reaction to attacks.…”
Section: Resistance To Malicious Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%