2003
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-45203-4_2
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Optimized χ 2-Attack against RC6

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Cited by 7 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…[12] applied the same attack as [11] expect that it considered RC6 without post whitening (RC6P) and showed that with 2 117.84 texts, the RC6 with 128bit key can be broken after 16 rounds. The ability of Linear cryptanalysis to break RC6 was investigated in [13] and showed that after 16 rounds with 2 119 text the RC6 can be broken. Multiple linear attack was also conducted in [14] and shows that with 2119,68 text and 192-bit key, RC6 can be broken at 14 rounds.…”
Section: Thementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…[12] applied the same attack as [11] expect that it considered RC6 without post whitening (RC6P) and showed that with 2 117.84 texts, the RC6 with 128bit key can be broken after 16 rounds. The ability of Linear cryptanalysis to break RC6 was investigated in [13] and showed that after 16 rounds with 2 119 text the RC6 can be broken. Multiple linear attack was also conducted in [14] and shows that with 2119,68 text and 192-bit key, RC6 can be broken at 14 rounds.…”
Section: Thementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nonetheless, some recent studies reported that RC6 can be broken under some attacks such as statistical attack, linear cryptanalysis, correlation attack and brute force attack [8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. One of the main reason behind the vulnerability of RC6 to attack is the ability to predict it cryptographic keys.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(D r+2 ) by using such plaintexts that make the final-round rotation 27 for each key candidate of S 2r+2 . For a correct key, z c is exactly equal to C [5,7] r = D [5,7] r−1 and, thus, Attack 2 computes the χ 2 -value on D [5,7] r−1 lsb 3 (D r+2 ) = D [5,7] r−1 lsb 3 (D r+1 ) for a correct key. For a wrong key, z c is not equal to D [5,7] r−1 , thus, wrong keys output lower χ 2 -value on z c lsb 3 (D r+2 ) compared to a correct key.…”
Section: Key Recovery Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, our attack cannot assume that each distribution of χ 2 -value with each wrong key is Table 5 The relation between lsb 2 (S 2r+1 ) lsb 2 (S 2r+3 ) and C [5,6] r in the case of a correct S 2r+2 .…”
Section: Theoretical Success Probabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
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