2013
DOI: 10.4018/ijsse.2013100102
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Optimal Voting Strategy against Random and Targeted Attacks

Abstract: Replication and value selection through voting are commonly used approaches to tolerating naturally caused failures. Without considering intentionally introduced failures, such as failures caused by attacks, having more replication or residency often makes the system more reliable. However, when both the reliability of individual replicas and the existence of attackers are taken into consideration, the number of replicas that participate in a voting process has significant impact on system reliability. In this… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…This requires the use of diversity, including but not limited to the use of multiple intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and disparate open-source intelligence data (e.g., infrastructure-related information about security from open-source intelligence data available on diverse sources from the internet). There has been only sparse research on how to choose among alternative layered defenses; occasionally, unsuitable models appear relying on the naive assumption of independent failures between the diverse components [ 80 ]. Security engineers have little or no theory to guide their decisions about diversity, although unaided intuition can be very misleading (e.g., Littlewood and Wright [ 81 ]).…”
Section: Limitations Of Current Siemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This requires the use of diversity, including but not limited to the use of multiple intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and disparate open-source intelligence data (e.g., infrastructure-related information about security from open-source intelligence data available on diverse sources from the internet). There has been only sparse research on how to choose among alternative layered defenses; occasionally, unsuitable models appear relying on the naive assumption of independent failures between the diverse components [ 80 ]. Security engineers have little or no theory to guide their decisions about diversity, although unaided intuition can be very misleading (e.g., Littlewood and Wright [ 81 ]).…”
Section: Limitations Of Current Siemsmentioning
confidence: 99%