Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal

Manfredi, Piero; Posta, Pompeo Della; d’Onofrio, Alberto; Salinelli, Ernesto; Centrone, Francesca; Meo, Claudia; Poletti, Piero

doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2009.09.109

Cited by 63 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…The simplest scenario, introduced in the static game-theory framework in [479], is represented by the conflict between two groups, namely vaccine vaccine skeptics (group 1) and believers (group 2), with different asymmetric perceived costs of infection and VAE: C V,1 > C V,2 , C I,1 < C I,2 . Let q n (n = 1, 2, q 1 + q 2 = 1) denote the relative size of each group (assumed to be constant), φ n the vaccination strategy adopted by individuals in group n and φ n the average coverage prevailing in group n. The P-scale model is represented by the following simple two groups' SIRV model with a class vaccinated at birth by a perfect vaccine, in a constant population, where the two groups differ only in the average coverage:…”

Section: Markov Decision Processes Show That the Interaction Between mentioning

confidence: 99%

Statistical physics of vaccination

et al. 2016

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Historically, infectious diseases caused considerable damage to human societies, and they continue to do so today. To help reduce their impact, mathematical models of disease transmission have been studied to help understand disease dynamics and inform prevention strategies. Vaccination-one of the most important preventive measures of modern times-is of great interest both theoretically and empirically. And in contrast to traditional approaches, recent research increasingly explores the pivotal implications of individual behavior and heterogeneous contact patterns in populations. Our report reviews the developmental arc of theoretical epidemiology with emphasis on vaccination, as it led from classical models assuming homogeneously mixing (mean-field) populations and ignoring human behavior, to recent models that account for behavioral feedback and/or population spatial/social structure. Many of the methods used originated in statistical physics, such as lattice and network models, and their associated analytical frameworks. Similarly, the feedback loop between vaccinating behavior and disease propagation forms a coupled nonlinear system with analogs in physics. We also review the new paradigm of digital epidemiology, wherein sources of digital data such as online social media are mined for high-resolution information on epidemiologically relevant individual behavior. Armed with the tools and concepts of statistical physics, and further assisted by new sources of digital data, models that capture nonlinear interactions between behavior and disease dynamics offer a novel way of modeling real-world phenomena, and can help improve health outcomes. We conclude the review by discussing open problems in the field and promising directions for future research.

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Section: Markov Decision Processes Show That the Interaction Between mentioning

confidence: 99%

Statistical physics of vaccination

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“…This might also be effective to manage the issue of rational exemption, namely, the decision not to get vaccinated after a seemingly rational comparison between the perceived utility and disutility of vaccination [47]. Highlighting the collective importance of vaccination for social protection is also an important method of communication [48].…”

Section: Crisis Communication For Effective Smallpox Vaccinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The public acceptance of smallpox vaccination to fight bioterrorism in Japan: results of a large-scale opinion survey in Japan

Sato

Tomio²,

Tanaka³

et al. 2010

Environ Health Prev Med

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Objectives This study examines the public acceptance of smallpox vaccinations in the event of a terrorist attack using smallpox. The article also provides public health professionals with the information necessary for such smallpox management. Methods A questionnaire survey was conducted in a city in Japan asking about prospective action when smallpox vaccination is advised after a terrorist attack and factors that could influence individual decisions about such vaccination. Results Only a tiny fraction of people (0.12%) expressed their rejection of vaccination. Of the respondents, 63.6% showed their intent to be vaccinated promptly when such a measure was required; 28.6% wanted to decide for themselves, having some reservations. Those in the younger age group, those suffering from hypertension/cardiac diseases, and those who considered the threat of smallpox terrorism less seriously were likely to reserve their vaccination decisions until after examining information.Conclusions Communication programs regarding smallpox vaccination should be well planned beforehand and should especially target those people who reserve their decisions at such times. Health professionals should also be well equipped with all information necessary for appropriate and effective smallpox management in the face of such a bioterrorism attack or the strong potential of one.

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“…Many subsequent developments were made in order to include the human behaviour in epidemiological models (cf. Chen (2006); d 'Onofrio et al (2007); Manfredi et al (2009);Coelho and Codeço (2009);Mbah et al (2012); Manfredi and D'Onofrio (2013); Morin et al (2013); Bhattacharyya et al (2015); Laguzet and Turinici (2015b)). See also (Funk et al, 2010;Wang et al, 2015) for a review, and (Funk et al, 2015) for further discussion on the subject.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal vaccination strategies and rational behaviour in seasonal epidemics

et al. 2016

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We consider a SIRS model with time dependent transmission rate. We assume time dependent vaccination which confers the same immunity as natural infection. We study two types of vaccination strategies: i) optimal vaccination, in the sense that it minimizes the effort of vaccination in the set of vaccination strategies for which, for any sufficiently small perturbation of the disease free state, the number of infectious individuals is monotonically decreasing; ii) Nash-equilibria strategies where all individuals simultaneously minimize the joint risk of vaccination versus the risk of the disease. The former case corresponds to an optimal solution for mandatory vaccinations, while the second corresponds to the equilibrium to be expected if vaccination is fully voluntary. We are able to show the existence of both optimal and Nash strategies in a general setting. In general, these strategies will not be functions but Radon measures. For specific forms of the transmission rate, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal and the Nash vaccination strategies.

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Optimal vaccination choice, vaccination games, and rational exemption: An appraisal

Cited by 63 publications

References 30 publications

Statistical physics of vaccination

Statistical physics of vaccination

The public acceptance of smallpox vaccination to fight bioterrorism in Japan: results of a large-scale opinion survey in Japan

Optimal vaccination strategies and rational behaviour in seasonal epidemics

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