2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.espe.2017.01.004
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Optimal v. simple financial policy rules in a production economy with “liability dollarization”

Abstract: We evaluate the effectiveness of financial policy rules in a small open economy with production, liability dollarization and "unconventional shocks" (global liquidity shifts and news about future fundamentals). Tradable and nontradable final goods are produced with tradable inputs. Debt is denominated in units of tradables and cannot exceed a fraction of the market value of total income. Optimal policy has a macroprudential or ex-ante component (a debt tax levied at date t only when the credit constraint may b… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(13 citation statements)
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References 16 publications
(28 reference statements)
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“…policy that applies when μ * t >0). For instance, in a liability dollarization model with production, the planner would like to reallocate inputs from nontradables to tradables production when μ * t >0, because this props up the value of collateral and makes the constraint less binding (see Hernandez and Mendoza (2016)). Fourth, if collateral values at date t are determined jointly by date-t and date-t+1 allocations, the optimal plans of the social planner can be time-inconsistent under commitment (see ).…”
Section: Pecuniary Externalities As a Rationale For Macroprudential Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…policy that applies when μ * t >0). For instance, in a liability dollarization model with production, the planner would like to reallocate inputs from nontradables to tradables production when μ * t >0, because this props up the value of collateral and makes the constraint less binding (see Hernandez and Mendoza (2016)). Fourth, if collateral values at date t are determined jointly by date-t and date-t+1 allocations, the optimal plans of the social planner can be time-inconsistent under commitment (see ).…”
Section: Pecuniary Externalities As a Rationale For Macroprudential Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, these models yield very favorable results about the effectiveness of optimal macroprudential policy, because of large pecuniary externalities. The specific formulation of the liability dollarization model is based on Hernandez and Mendoza (2016), which in turn follows from .…”
Section: Complexity Of the Optimal Policy In A Liability Dollarizatiomentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…33, Bank for International Settlements, January 2009.2 This framework originated in the seminal articles bySalter (1959),Swan (1960), and Díaz-Alejandro (1965).3 This setup originates in the work ofMendoza (2002). Studies that explore the models' normative implications, and in particular the implications for macroprudential policy, include Bianchi (2011),Benigno et al (2016),Korinek (2011), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017),Bianchi et al (2016), andHernández and Mendoza (2017).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%