Optimal transmission expansion under different market structures

Shrestha, G.B.; Fonseka, P.A.J.

doi:10.1049/iet-gtd:20060391

Cited by 23 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This paradigm is gaining continuously ground as the participation of multiple merchant companies and the resulting competition arising in transmission planning are advocated as a further step towards the deregulation and liberalization of the electricity industry [2]- [4], [17]. The first instances of merchant transmission planning can be found in the USA, Australia, Argentina and Brazil, although the adopted frameworks constitute a mix of centralized and merchant planning [2], [3], [18]- [22].…”

Section: A Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More importantly, merchant investors are assumed competitive, price-taking entities, considering the locational marginal prices (LMP) as exogenous signals that cannot be influenced by their individual actions. In reality however, in a similar fashion with strategic behavior observed in energy markets, merchant investors will attempt to exercise market power and manipulate the LMP to increase their profits beyond the centralized planning levels, through strategic network investments [2], [3], [24]- [27].…”

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [25], [26] and [2], [3], this competitive behavior assumption is removed. Authors in [25], [26] show that under certain conditions (neglect of fixed costs of network assets, congestion rights satisfying certain feasibility constraints, no imperfections in the energy market), merchant investments are socially efficient.…”

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Authors in [3] make the first attempt to consider a setting with multiple merchant companies and analytically derive the relation between the procured transmission capacity under the centralized and the merchant transmission paradigm. The results indicate that the merchant paradigm leads to underinvestment with respect to the centralized approach but such under-investment is reduced as the number of merchant companies is increased.…”

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Investigating the Social Efficiency of Merchant Transmission Planning Through a Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework

Paola

Papadaskalopoulos

Angeli

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Merchant transmission planning is considered as a further step towards the full liberalization of the electricity industry. However, previous modeling approaches do not comprehensively explore its social efficiency as they cannot effectively deal with a large number of merchant companies. This paper addresses this fundamental challenge by adopting a novel non-cooperative game-theoretic approach. Specifically, the number of merchant companies is assumed sufficiently large to be approximated as a continuum. This allows the derivation of mathematical conditions for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium solution of the merchant planning game. By analytically and numerically comparing this solution against the one obtained through the traditional centralized planning approach, the paper demonstrates that merchant planning can maximize social welfare only when the following conditions are satisfied: a) fixed investment costs are neglected and b) the network is radial and does not include any loops. Given that these conditions do not generally hold in reality, these findings suggest that even a fully competitive merchant transmission planning framework, involving the participation of a very large number of competing merchant companies, is not generally capable of maximizing social welfare.Index Terms-Game theory, merchant transmission investors, Nash equilibrium, transmission planning. NOMENCLATUREA. Indices t ∈ T Index and set of time periods m ∈ M Index and set of network branches n ∈ N Index and set of network nodes l ∈ L Index and set of network loops i ∈ I Index and set of merchant transmission companies B. Parameters w tWeighting factor of period t T Power generation at node n and period t (MW) D n,t Power demand at node n and period t (MW) f m,t Power flow on branch m at period t (MW) P n,t Net power outflow from node n at period t (MW) λ n,t Locational marginal price at node n and period t (£/MWh) D. Functions T m (·) Transmission investment cost for branch m (£/h) C n,t (·) Cost of generation at node n and period t (£/h) B n,t (·) Benefit of demand at node n and period t (£/h) J(i, ·) Profit of company i (£/h)

show abstract

Section: A Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Relevant Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Investigating the Social Efficiency of Merchant Transmission Planning Through a Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework

Paola

Papadaskalopoulos

Angeli

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Besides, shorter construction lead time of storage devices in contrast to transmission lines and their scalability and modular structure makes storage devices an attractive alternative approach for managing transmission constraints raised from rapid integration of wind power. Different approaches for transmission congestion management have been proposed in the literature while here the Standard Market Design paradigm is selected [22], [23]. A multi-period dynamic optimal power flow is defined with ramping constraints seeking to minimize conventional generation operational costs, load shedding, wind curtailment and environmental costs as hourly social costs (HSC):…”

Section: Proposed Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust computational framework for mid‐term techno‐economical assessment of energy storage

Maghouli¹,

Soroudi

Keane

2016

IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Rapid expansion and integration of wind energy is restrained due to transmission capacity constraints and conventional generation technologies limited operational flexibility in todays power systems. Energy storage is an attractive option to integrate and utilize more renewable energy without major and timely upgrade of existing transmission infrastructure. Also it can be considered as a mean for differing the reinforcement plans. The evaluation of energy storage deployment projects is a challenging task due to severe uncertainty of wind power generation. In this paper a robust techno-economic framework is proposed for energy storage evaluation based on Information Gap Decision Theory for handling wind generation uncertainty. The total social cost of the system including conventional generators' fuel and pollution cost and wind power curtailment cost is optimized considering generators operational constraints and transmission system capacity limitations based on the DC model of the power grid. The effect of storage devices on system performance is evaluated taking into account wind power uncertainty. The proposed method is conducted on the modified IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) and the modified IEEE 118 bus test system to assess its applicability and performance in midterm robust evaluation of energy storage implementation plans.Index Terms-DC optimal power flow, Storage devices, Transmission capacity constraints, Wind power generation, Information Gap Decision Theory. NOMENCLATURE Sets & Indices Capacity of Wind turbine installed in busCharging/discharging efficiency of the energy storage unitCritical/opportunistic increase/decrease of base cost in RA/RS approach ($) ∆t Duration of time period t ag/bg/cg Fuel cost coefficient of thermal unit g P I. INTRODUCTION A. Background and motivationsMany countries have long term plans to increase the share of renewable energy resources in their generation mix. Among these renewable resources there has been increasing interest to invest and integrate more wind power in to existing power systems. However, increasing the wind penetration introduces profound challenges to traditional operating and planning practices. These new challenges arise mainly because of the variable nature of wind energy which results in none optimal operation of electric power systems. Traditionally it is accepted that electricity supply and consumption must remain in instantaneous balance the opportunity to store electrical energy in storage devices may now change this paradigm. Wind power intermittency and variability requires other fast ramping power sources to balance the supply-demand equilibrium in power systems [1]. Because of limiting capacity of fast ramping generation technologies such as hydro and pumped storage power plants, significant integration of wind power to existing power infrastructure requires major system upgrades or implementing energy storage facilities [2]. Besides, using energy storage facilities will result in more utilization of existing assets and ...

show abstract

Multistage transmission network expansion planning in competitive electricity market based on bi‐level programming method

Fan

Cheng

2010

Int Trans Elec Energy Syst

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SUMMARYA new bi-level programming model for market-based transmission network expansion planning is presented in the paper. Open access transmission brings new challenges to transmission network expansion planning. From the transmission corporation's view, the goal of optimal transmission network expansion planning scheme should not only bring the optimal transmission profit in the market, but also ensure high operation security and reliability, meanwhile social welfare is necessary to be accounted for. In this paper, the upper level programming considers transmission profit maximization in long-term planning, the lower level programming considers the social welfare maximization in short-term operation. Furthermore, NÀ1 security constraints are also considered in the model. A hybrid algorithm integrated with niche genetic algorithm (GA) and primal-dual interior method is adopted to solve the proposed bi-level programming model of the transmission network expansion planning. The planning methodology has been demonstrated on the 18-bus system to show the feasibility and validity, moreover, comparison has been made between traditional transmission expansion plan and proposed market-based transmission expansion plan; it was also applied to the real life system 77-bus system transmission grid.

show abstract

Optimal transmission expansion under different market structures

Cited by 23 publications

References 8 publications

Investigating the Social Efficiency of Merchant Transmission Planning Through a Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework

Investigating the Social Efficiency of Merchant Transmission Planning Through a Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework

Robust computational framework for mid‐term techno‐economical assessment of energy storage

Multistage transmission network expansion planning in competitive electricity market based on bi‐level programming method

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About