Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence

Hakenes, Hendrik; Katolnik, Svetlana

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2355731

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…There are also a couple of papers that consider questions of optimal team size when agents have non-standard preferences or beliefs. Thus, Hakenes and Katolnik (2013) show that overconfidence of team members about their own skills can help to overcome the free-rider problem and increase optimal partnership size under certain conditions. Finally, and of greatest relevance to this paper, Bartling and von Siemens (2010) show that when agents are inequity averse over payoffs net of their effort costs and the sharing rule is endogenously determined, incumbent partners may veto the admission of new members who do not increase average productivity even when it would be efficient to admit them.…”

Section: Optimal Team Size In the Linear Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Desert and inequity aversion in teams

Gill

Stone

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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a b s t r a c tTeams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether their preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.

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Section: Optimal Team Size In the Linear Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Desert and inequity aversion in teams

Gill

Stone

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Evidence suggests that confident managers can lead to smaller team size. Managers only prefer to create larger teams when the complementary strengths of members are evident (Hakenes & Katolnik, 2018).…”

Section: Culture and Team Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the inventor team size: A view from “The Rice Theory”

Zhao

Zong

2022

International Studies of Economics

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The inventor is a vital input in acquiring new technologies. Collaboration among inventors is an essential topic for scholars. Talhelm et al. proposed The Rice Theory, highlighting the cultural differences between rice and wheat regions. This paper explores the differences in inventor team size under rice and wheat cultures using invention patent data in China. The results of ordinary least square estimation and instrumental variable estimation indicate that the size of inventor teams under rice culture is significantly smaller than that under wheat culture by 0.558–0.721 persons. Using the Chinese Qinling–Huaihe line, this paper constructs a regression discontinuity (RD) design. The local average treatment effect estimation confirms the difference in rice and wheat cultures. Subsequently, we demonstrate the significant existence of this difference through lots of robustness checks. We try to explain the phenomenon from the perspective of “The Rice Theory” by arguing that inventors in rice regions may be more inclined to collaborate but with a smaller inventor team size. This paper demonstrates the cultural differences in the performance of inventor team size, informing our understanding of input in research and development (R&D) activities.

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“…There are also a couple of papers that consider questions of optimal team size when agents have non-standard preferences or beliefs. Thus,Hakenes and Katolnik (2013) show that overcon…dence of team members about their own skills can help to overcome the free-rider problem and increase optimal partnership size under certain conditions. Finally, and of greatest relevance to this paper,Bartling and von Siemens (2010) show that when agents are inequity averse over payo¤s net of their e¤ort costs and the sharing rule is endogenously determined, incumbent partners may veto the admission of new members who do not increase average productivity even when it would be e¢ cient to admit them.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%