Optimal payment sharing mechanism for renewable energy aggregation

Harirchi, Farshad; Vincent, Tyrone L.; Yang, Dejun

doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm.2014.7007714

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…An extension of the PAM in [10] is proposed in [12], where statistical information of the RPPs is used to find the optimal forward power contract of the aggregator (similar to prior studies in the "ex-ante" settings [13]). The PAM of [10] is used as the base case, and the difference between the total payoff of the aggregation when it uses the optimal forward contract vs. when it uses the sum of RPPs' power contracts is distributed among the RPPs.…”

Section: Related Work On Payoff Allocation To Achieve Ex-post Promentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Khazaei

Zhao

2017

2017 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)

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Aggregating statistically diverse renewable power producers (RPPs) is an effective way to reduce the uncertainty of the RPPs. The key question in aggregation of RPPs is how to allocate payoffs among the RPPs. In this paper, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) with a simple closed-form expression is proposed: It achieves stability (in the core) and fairness both in the "ex-post" sense, i.e., for all possible realizations of renewable power generation. Furthermore, this PAM can in fact be derived from the competitive equilibrium in a market. The proposed PAM is evaluated in a simulation study with ten wind power producers in the PJM interconnection.

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Section: Related Work On Payoff Allocation To Achieve Ex-post Promentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, we employ the following model (cf. [10], [11], [12]) for aggregating RPPs: a. Each RPP i submits a DA commitment c i pě 0q to the aggregator.…”

Section: B Aggregation Of Rpps and Payoff Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Khazaei

Zhao

2017

2017 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)

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“…APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2 From Theorem 1, if a pure NE exists, it must take the form of (14). In this proof, we show that 1) If condition (15) holds, then (14) is indeed a pure NE, and 2) If condition (15) does not hold, then there exists a set of DA and RT prices such that a pure NE does not exist. Part 1): Suppose condition (15) holds.…”

Section: Appendix B Proof Of Theoremmentioning

confidence: 74%

“…To this end, a simple interface between aggregator and RPPs has been proposed in [13]: each RPP submits just a single number to the aggregator, and the aggregator simply passes on the sum of these numbers as the forward power contract for the entire aggregation. Based on this simple interface, the central design task is again on the payoff allocation among the RPPs, for which a number of payoff allocation mechanisms (PAMs) have been proposed [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Under any given PAM, the RPPs' strategic decision making entails a non-cooperative game (as will be described later in Section II-E), and properties of the Nash Equilibria of this game have been studied in [13], [14], [15], [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect Mechanism Design for Efficient and Stable Renewable Energy Aggregation

Khazaei

Zhao

2019

2019 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

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Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium (CE) of a specially formulated market with transferrable payoff. Given the designed mechanism, the strategic behaviors of the participating RPPs entail a non-cooperative game: It is proven that a unique pure Nash equilibrium (NE) exists among the RPPs, for which a closed-form expression is found. Moreover, it is proven that the designed mechanism achieves a number of key desirable properties at the NE: these include efficiency (i.e., an ideal "Price of Anarchy" of one), stability (i.e., "in the core" from a coalitional game theoretic perspective), and no collusion. In addition, it is shown that a set of desirable "ex-post" properties are also achieved by the designed mechanism. Extensive simulations are conducted and corroborate the theoretical results.

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“…This approach provides results on the existence of Nash equilibria for the contract game defined by this payment sharing mechanism, however it does not optimize the payoff of the aggregate. In [8], a payment sharing mechanism is proposed in which the payments are based on the production of individual suppliers, and it optimizes the payoff for the aggregate.…”

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confidence: 99%

Effect of bonus payments in cost sharing mechanism design for renewable energy aggregation

Harirchi

Vincent

Yang

2016

2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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The participation of renewable energy sources in energy markets is challenging, mainly because of the uncertainty associated with the renewables. Aggregation of renewable energy suppliers is shown to be very effective in decreasing this uncertainty. In the present paper, we propose a cost sharing mechanism that entices the suppliers of wind, solar and other renewable resources to form or join an aggregate. In particular, we consider the effect of a bonus for surplus in supply, which is neglected in previous work. We introduce a specific proportional cost sharing mechanism, which satisfies the desired properties of such mechanisms that are introduced in the literature, e.g., budget balancedness, ex-post individual rationality and fairness. In addition, we show that the proposed mechanism results in a stable market outcome. Finally, the results of the paper are illustrated by numerical examples. arXiv:1609.07448v1 [math.OC]

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Optimal payment sharing mechanism for renewable energy aggregation

Cited by 17 publications

References 7 publications

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Indirect Mechanism Design for Efficient and Stable Renewable Energy Aggregation

Effect of bonus payments in cost sharing mechanism design for renewable energy aggregation

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