Optimal Housing Maintenance under Rent Control

Moorhouse, John C.

doi:10.2307/1056228

Cited by 35 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…controls also affects housing quality. 3 For example, Albon and Stafford (1990), Arnault (1975), Frankena (1975), Kanemoto (1990), Kiefer (1980), Moorhouse (1972) and Seshimo (2003) have examined the impact of (tenancy) rent control on the maintenance of (or investment in) rental dwellings. They show that because (tenancy) rent control may reduce the profit of rental housing businesses, landlords reduce maintenance on their housing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

Iwata

Yamaga

2008

Journal of Housing Economics

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This paper considers three tenure modes -owner-owned housing, tenant-owned housing, and landlord-owned housing -and models the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on housing quality. We show theoretically that the rental externality has no impact on the housing quality of tenant-owned housing, but tenure security has an ambiguous effect when the user's utilization and the owner's maintenance are complements.We also show that the rental externality and tenure security both reduce landlord-owned housing quality when the user's utilization and the owner's maintenance are substitutes.Empirical investigation yields results that are consistent with the theoretical predictions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

Iwata

Yamaga

2008

Journal of Housing Economics

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“…Dildine & Massey, 1974;Kutty, 1996;Margolis, 1985;Mayer, 1981;Moorhouse, 1982) on the investment behaviour of a landlord is the assumption that he maximises the current value of the expected stream of pro® ts (the share of rental income that remain s after running costs and maintenance expen ses are paid) arising from the ownersh ip of a rental property. In view of the extreme durability of housing a landlord is assumed to adopt a perspective of an in® nite horizon.…”

Section: Economic Theory Concerning the Maintenance Of Private Rentalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It h as been a common conclusion in the economic literature on the effects of rent control (Malpezzi, 1990;Moorhouse, 1982;Niebank, 1985) that landlords are expected to reduce maintenance and improvement. The simple argument is that if maintenance does not affect rental incomes it is not pro® table to maintain the quality of the dwellings.…”

Section: Economic Theory Concerning the Maintenance Of Private Rentalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motives for Investments in Housing Rehabilitation among Private Landlords under Rent Control

Andersen¹

1998

Housing Studies

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In economic studies of the private rental sector of the housing market, and in political debates on housing policy, it is often assumed that private landlords are basically guided by rational economic motives. In this paper, which is based on a Danish study of housing rehabilitati on activity among private landlords under rent control, it is shown that differen t groups of landlords exist who have many other motives for buying and maintaining rental property than those assumed in economic theory. It is concluded that private landlords do not behave as economic, rational and ef® cient actors as is often assumed, and that an understanding of these structures of landlordism is essential to an assessment of the role of private landlords in housing supply, and to an elaboration of public programmes for supporting housing rehabilitat ion in the private rental sector.

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“…3 There is a substantial body of literature on the effects of rent control. See, for instance, Downs (1988); Malpezzi (1990);Niehank (1985); Moorhouse (1982); RydeU and Noel (1982);and Sternlieb (1974). It can, however, be argued that a rent control scheme could be designed in a way that creates incentives for investment in rehabilitation; see Turner (1990) and Skifter Andersen (1992, 1993.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanations of decay and renewal in the housing market: What can Europe learn from American research?

Andersen¹

1995

Neth J of Housing and the Built Environment

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Optimal Housing Maintenance under Rent Control

Cited by 35 publications

References 5 publications

Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

Motives for Investments in Housing Rehabilitation among Private Landlords under Rent Control

Explanations of decay and renewal in the housing market: What can Europe learn from American research?

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