2010
DOI: 10.1002/jsc.859
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Optimal financial contracting: control rights, incentives, and entrepreneurship

Abstract: Optimal financial contracting is particularly important for entrepreneurial firms with illiquid securities.

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Cited by 7 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Some seminal papers on asymmetrical information illustrate the underpinnings of information economics and explore the main effects of asymmetrical information. They have been used extensively as a foundation in the literature on entrepreneurial finance [13,16,46,[54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62]. These papers include that of Akerlof's theory of "lemons" [63], Jensen and Meckling's exploration of the principal-agent-problem in investor-investee relationships [64], Leland and Pyle's paper on the role of signalling in the IPO/share-issuing process [65], as well as Stiglitz and Weiss' model of "credit rationing" [66].…”
Section: Central Theories In the Entrepreneurial Finance Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Some seminal papers on asymmetrical information illustrate the underpinnings of information economics and explore the main effects of asymmetrical information. They have been used extensively as a foundation in the literature on entrepreneurial finance [13,16,46,[54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62]. These papers include that of Akerlof's theory of "lemons" [63], Jensen and Meckling's exploration of the principal-agent-problem in investor-investee relationships [64], Leland and Pyle's paper on the role of signalling in the IPO/share-issuing process [65], as well as Stiglitz and Weiss' model of "credit rationing" [66].…”
Section: Central Theories In the Entrepreneurial Finance Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Once the money has been delivered, there is an incentive for the entrepreneurs or managers to take on projects that are riskier than the ones originally agreed upon, which is particularly likely in the case of more intangible company assets [16,59]. Not only risk is a potential problem, the entrepreneur may invest insufficient effort or may indulge in expenses or make decisions that are not otherwise aligned with investor preferences [13,17,49,55]. This situation, described as moral hazard, is thus a central part of the principal-agent problem and is likely to increase with the amount of external funds needed [17] as well as with particularly low or high levels of entrepreneurial wealth [59].…”
Section: Central Theories In the Entrepreneurial Finance Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…While research in both entrepreneurial finance and sustainable entrepreneurship has individually thrived and developed strongly in the last decades (Mitter and Kraus, 2011; Thompson et al , 2011), there are few instances where the two research fields merge (Bergset, 2015; Bocken, 2015; Cumming et al , 2016; Randjelovic et al , 2003). The entrepreneurial finance literature examines different aspects of business finance at early stages of company development from both the supply and demand sides, such as investor and entrepreneurial behaviour (Cable and Shane, 1997; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001), potential conflicts arising between the two sides due to asymmetrical information and moral hazard (Denis, 2004) as well as possible solutions in terms of contract design (Fluck, 2010). The sustainable entrepreneurship literature builds on the research streams of social entrepreneurship and environmental entrepreneurship, and studies entrepreneurship in which a contribution to sustainable development is integral to the core business of the companies (Schaltegger and Wagner, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%