Optimal environmental quality and price with consumer environmental awareness and retailer's fairness concerns in supply chain

Zhang, Linghong; Zhou, Hao; Liu, Yanyan; Lü, Rui

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.187

Cited by 98 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Equations (15) and (16) are incentive compatibility conditions. To ensure maximum profits for dealers, the constraint of Formula (17) is that the dealer and the manufacturer are willing to cooperate if their profits are greater under coordination; in that case, the supply chain enterprise accepts the contract coordination mechanism. According to Gérard et al [21], the revenue sharing contract needs to meet p j * n = p n , p j * t = p t ; assuming p j * n = p n , p j * t = p t , we get Proposition 8.…”

Section: Coordination Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relevant scholars have studied the impact of consumer environmental awareness on product prices in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, and constructed models to obtain the optimal product prices when the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. However, they did not discuss consumer types based on consumer environmental awareness [17]. Some experts established a low-carbon supply chain profit model by considering consumer preferences, considering the differences in consumer preferences, and quantifying them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

2020

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Given consumers' willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV's supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers' low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers' low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers' profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers' profits, and the sum of the two members' profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.

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Section: Coordination Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

2020

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“…Also, Liu et al [21] investigated the impact of different fairness concerns on order allocation in the logistics service supply chain. Zhang et al [22] revealed the characteristics of price changes when fairness concern was categorized into unfavorable and favorable disutility, respectively. e above papers mainly studied how fairness concerns affected decision variables in various supply chain structures.…”

Section: Fairness Concernmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

et al. 2020

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The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

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“…Arshad et al [29] introduced horizontal fairness concerns behavior into the dual-channel closed supply chain based on manufacturer monopoly, analyzing the influence of decision makers' fairness concerns on the choice of recycling strategy, and the optimal decision of members. Zhang et al [30] focused on investigating the effects of consumer environmental awareness (CEA) and retailer fairness on environmental quality and green product prices by comparing three different decision scenarios. Xiao et al [31] investigated the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain with manufacturers leading and studied the effects of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concerns.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

Huan-yong

Zhang

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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This paper addresses the problem of green manufacturing decision making for a green dual-channel supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer will decide whether to adopt green manufacturing under the influence of the retailer’s fairness concern-based dual-channel. Thus, we discuss two decision scenarios: the no green manufacturing strategy with retailer fairness (NM model), and green manufacturing with retailer fairness (GM model). Our study has several findings: Firstly, adopting a green manufacturing strategy is not always beneficial to supply-chain members when a retailer has fairness. In particular, when fairness is at a relatively high level, the manufacturer will not adopt green manufacturing. Secondly, under green manufacturing, the product’s green degree and subsidies have a positive impact on the price and demand and the members’ profit and utility. Besides, the subsidies and retailer fairness have a counter effect on the optimal decision. Thirdly, comparing the two scenarios (NM & GM), we found that the channel price of the GM model is lower than the NM model. Finally, from the perspective of the supply chain system, the system tends toward the manufacturer adopting green manufacturing and maintaining retailer fairness concerns at a lower level.

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Optimal environmental quality and price with consumer environmental awareness and retailer's fairness concerns in supply chain

Cited by 98 publications

References 41 publications

Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

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