Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Paroush, Jacob

doi:10.1007/s003550000080

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Since the signals are conditionally independent, given the state of the world, (8) and (9), respectively, are equal to…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The difference between the expected utility if i also votes informatively or if his strategy is to vote −1 regardless of his signal is given by (8). The conditional probabilities in this expression can be computed by summing over all voting vectors in which i's vote is +1 and he is pivotal, which means that the total number of members voting +1 equals the quota q.…”

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other related papers include [6], [7], [9], [20], [21], [31], [32] and [33]. Extensions of the two-alternative model have been suggested in [4], [5] and [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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First and second best voting rules in committees

Ben-Yashar

Milchtaich

2007

Soc Choice Welfare

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Abstract.A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters' identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote noninformatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.* We are grateful to Jacob Paroush, Shmuel Nitzan, Steven Brams, Michele Piccione and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.

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“…Since the signals are conditionally independent, given the state of the world, (8) and (9), respectively, are equal to…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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First and second best voting rules in committees

Ben-Yashar

Milchtaich

2007

Soc Choice Welfare

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“…Although it was originally stated only for dichotomous decisions made by majority vote, the CJT has been generalized to polychotomous decisions made by the plurality rule (Ben-Yashar and Paroush, 2001;List and Goodin, 2001), and even other voting rules such as the Kemeny rule and the Borda rule (Young, 1986(Young, , 1988(Young, , 1995(Young, , 1997. Furthermore, in these contexts, the "nonasymptotic" part of the CJT can be refined: under certain conditions, the output of the voting rule is a maximum likelihood estimator of the correct answer (see Pivato (2013b) for a general formulation of these results).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic democracy with correlated voters

Pivato

2017

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We develop a general theory of epistemic democracy in large societies, which subsumes the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Wisdom of Crowds, and other similar results. We show that a suitably chosen voting rule will converge to the correct answer in the large-population limit, even if there is significant correlation amongst voters, as long as the average correlation between voters becomes small as the population becomes large. Finally, we show that these hypotheses are consistent with models where voters are correlated via a social network, or through the DeGroot model of deliberation.

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“…Organizations with multiple evaluators can circumvent the limitations of a single individual's capacity in information gathering and processing and reduce errors. As mentioned in a latest research paper in this area, Koh (2005): "Over the past three decades, various aspects of collective decision-making in various contexts has been studied in the literature, which includes the following: Klevorick and Rotschild (1979), Nitzan and Paroush (1980, 1982, Klevorick et al (1984); Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988, Gradstein et al (1990), Sah (1990Sah ( , 1991, Stiglitz (2002), Koh (1992aKoh ( , b, 1993Koh ( , 1994a, Pete et al (1993), Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Berg and Paroush (1998), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997 and Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2001). Furthermore, the strategic aspects of collective decision-making in the committee setting have been examined by Feddersen and Pesedorfer (1998), Dekel and Piccione (2000), Li et al (2001), Persico (2004), and others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Signal Quality and Risky Project Evaluation in Organizations (Environment, Adoptability and Choice–Hierarchies and Polyarchies)

Seber¹

2014

IJEF

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In this paper, risky project evaluation in organizations is modelled in a linear information signal framework, which enables the following multidimensional analysis: "Ability"-Agents may have different abilities in processing information for risky project evaluation; "Endogenity"-It is possible to choose the organization type internally, or the organization type may be determined externally by the environment, in which case it is necessary for the evaluation criteria to adopt to the environment; "Sensitivity"-Risky and risk-free alternatives may not necessarily be equal with positive risk sensitivity and positive price of risk; "Project Quality"-The project quality may always be a certain type, for example, fixed (below or above average all the time) or it may be variable, which may affect the evaluation criteria; "Communication"-Communication between the agents may be in an information quality improving or detoriorating manner; "Coordination"-There may be an existance problem for the organization (it may exist due to an external setup, or from internal dynamics), and there may be a need for coordination between the agents in case it exists with internal dynamics. Risky project evaluation in organizations with a specific information signal quality has not been analyzed in the literature before and is a contribution of this paper. As a result of the analysis, most of the multidimensional variables mentioned in organizational decision making are original and specific to our paper. The results of the analysis have policy implications in all types of organizational settings of collective decision-making environments like family, firm, government, education, military, politics, and economic systems.

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Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations

Cited by 27 publications

References 2 publications

First and second best voting rules in committees

First and second best voting rules in committees

Epistemic democracy with correlated voters

Information Signal Quality and Risky Project Evaluation in Organizations (Environment, Adoptability and Choice–Hierarchies and Polyarchies)

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