Optimal cordon pricing in a non-monocentric city

Mun, Se-il; Konishi, Ko-ji; Yoshikawa, Kazuhiro

doi:10.1016/j.tra.2005.02.020

Cited by 30 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Levinson et al (2006) and Zhang et al (2007) used an agentbased approach to investigate how networks evolve over time. In this area of study, while Mun et al (2005) focused on the development of a non-monocentric, linearised city, others have opted to develop two-dimensional continuum models (solved using finite element methods) capable of representing multiple Central Business Districts (CBD) (Ho et al, 2005;Ho & Wong, 2007). From the field of Economic Geography, Anas & Pines (2008) analyse the move away from monocentric models to polycentric ones.…”

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whilst Mun et al (2005) studied optimal cordon pricing in a non-mono-centric city, they assume a one dimensional linear city but with more than one CBD. Their research revealed that cordon pricing is not always effective for congestion management in non-mono-centric cities and it tends to be effective as the urban structure is more mono-centric.…”

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our work differs significantly from that of Mun et al in that we analyse the optimal toll between two cities competing with each other whereas Mun et al consider one city with many CBDs. Moreover, our model considers cities developed in two-dimensional space that is to say that the transport network represents a real-world physical network as opposed to the onedimensional model adopted by Mun et al (2005).…”

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

Shepherd

Balijepalli

2015

Transport Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we model the competition between two cities as a game to maximise the welfare considering the impact of demand management strategies in the form of cordon tolls. This research builds on earlier work which studied the competition in a small tolled network meant for private modes of transport which have a choice of route. The earlier work showed that while both cities have an incentive to charge alone, once they begin, they are likely to fall into the 'Nash Trap' of a prisoner's dilemma where the incentive to defect is higher than that to cooperate thus eventually leading to a 'lose-lose' situation. The current paper extends the idea of competition between cities by setting up a system dynamic model of two cities which includes modes such as car, bus, train and walking and cycling. This paper innovates by integrating the simulation of land use transport interactions with a class room style experimental game and analyses the gaming strategies from a continuous repeated prisoner's dilemma involving setting of tolls to maximise the welfare of residents. The aim is to test (a) whether the strategies adopted are as theory predicts and (b) whether the players recognise the benefits of lower tolls when given information about the regulated solution and collaborate or continue to play to win. The results show that players respond to the information and maintain a collaborative solution which may have significant implications for regulation and the development of cities within regional partnerships.

show abstract

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

Shepherd

Balijepalli

2015

Transport Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Previous theoretical studies on cordon pricing schemes have yet to find a closed-form solution for the decision pair (x cor , τ cor ) (Verhoef, 2005;Mun et al, 2003;Mun et al, 2005). They have all used numerical simulations to show that the welfare loss is quite small, and that traffic volumes inside the cordon are slightly larger than the first-best optimum while traffic outside the cordon is slightly larger than the first-best optimum (Mun et al, 2003).…”

Section: Modeling Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, the effect of cordon pricing on the urban structure is not yet fully understood. Verhoef (2005) improved upon Mun et al (2003Mun et al ( , 2005 by allowing for endogenous city boundary, residential density and labor supply, but a closed-form analytical solution was not found. Their simulation results show a kink in the bid-rent curve and residential density gradient at the cordon location, as expected.…”

Section: Modeling Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%