2016
DOI: 10.3386/w22156
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Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile

Abstract: We would like to thank Bob Gibbons, Bengt Holmström, Stephen Morris and seminar participants at MIT and the Econometric Society meetings, San Francisco, 2016 for helpful comments. We also thank Elliot Ash for research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER … Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Section 4 builds on and discusses his model in detail. MacLeod and Tan (2016) extend the model by considering malfeasance and more general timings and information structures. Deb et al (2016) consider multiple agents working for the principal.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Section 4 builds on and discusses his model in detail. MacLeod and Tan (2016) extend the model by considering malfeasance and more general timings and information structures. Deb et al (2016) consider multiple agents working for the principal.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…See also Deb et al (2016) and Bester and Münster (2016). 1 MacLeod (2003), Fuchs (2007), Chan and Zheng (2011) and MacLeod and Tan (2016) provide formal proofs for these claims.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%