Optimal Apportionment

Koriyama, Yukio; Laslier, Jean‐François; Macé, Antonin; Treibich, Rafael

doi:10.1086/670380

Cited by 83 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Although there may be agreement between utility and voting power considerations (particularly voting in bargaining committees), they are generally different. In take-it-or-leave-it settings, utility-based concepts have emerged only very recently (Barbera and Jackson, 2006;Beisbart et al, 2005;Koriyama et al, 2013;Laruelle and Valenciano, 2010). One reason the focus has been on voting power may be that it can be derived from a voting system alone without specifying utility.…”

Section: Theory: Equalizing Voting Power and Maximizing Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing Voting Systems Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment

Weber

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThere are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. A natural question is what voting system such a committee should use. Concepts based on voting power provide guidelines for this choice. The two most prominent concepts require the Banzhaf power index to be proportional to the square root of group size or the Shapley-Shubik power index to be proportional to group size. Instead of studying the choice of voting systems based on such theoretical concepts, in this paper, I ask which systems individuals actually prefer. To answer this question, I design a laboratory experiment in which participants choose voting systems. I find that people behind the veil of ignorance prefer voting systems following the rule of proportional Shapley-Shubik power; in front of the veil subjects prefer voting systems benefiting their own group. Participants' choices can only partially be explained by utility maximization or other outcome based concepts.JEL classification: D71, D72, C91

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Section: Theory: Equalizing Voting Power and Maximizing Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing Voting Systems Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment

Weber

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Closely related, evaluate total expected utility under different decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the premise that proposals always affect all individuals from a given country identically. Koriyama et al (2013) argue in great generality that a utilitarian ideal requires vote allocation rules to be degressively proportional.…”

Section: A Model With Global Collective Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting Power and Procedures

Fara¹,

Leech²,

Salles³

2014

Studies in Choice and Welfare

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“…If they do, representatives are likely to vote in blocks and the effect on voting outcomes is no longer proportional to the size of the region's population, hence in larger problems there is a systematic bias in favour of larger regions. The literature on voting power and power indices 90 (Penrose, 1946, Shapley and Shubik, 1954and Banzhaf, 1965; for a recent survey see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) study weighted voting situations such as the European Council of Ministers (Kóczy, 2011), Penrose's square root law (Penrose, 1946) or the degressive proportionality (Laslier, 2012;Koriyama et al, 2013) of the base+prop method (Pukelsheim, 2007) …”

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confidence: 99%

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation

Bíró

Kóczy

Sziklai

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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The Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters specifies that (single-seat) constituencies should be drawn so that the size difference of a constituency's size from the average should not exceed a fixed limit while its borders must not cross the borders of administrative regions, such as states or counties.Assuming that constituencies are of equal size within each of the administrative regions, the problem is equivelent to the apportionment problem, that is, the proportional allocation of voting districts among the administrative regions.We show that the principle of maximum admissible departure is incompatible with common apportionment properties, such as monotonicity and Hare-quota.When multiple apportionments satisfy the smallest maximum admissible departure property we find a unique apportionment by the repeated application of the property. The allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized can be found using an efficient algorithm.This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using data from

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Optimal Apportionment

Cited by 83 publications

References 22 publications

Choosing Voting Systems Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment

Choosing Voting Systems Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment

Voting Power and Procedures

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation

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