1999
DOI: 10.1006/juec.1998.2119
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Optimal and Equilibrium Membership in Clubs in the Presence of Spillovers

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Cited by 23 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, following on from Conley and Dix [16] we shall differentiate between two types of expenditure spillovers: (i) "benefit spillovers," arising from the provision of local public goods, and (ii) "crowding spillovers," arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. The introduction of crowding spillovers in the model has implications for the specification of the expenditure reaction function, since the neighbor's covariates (e.g., population, cost drivers) should now also be included in the equation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, following on from Conley and Dix [16] we shall differentiate between two types of expenditure spillovers: (i) "benefit spillovers," arising from the provision of local public goods, and (ii) "crowding spillovers," arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. The introduction of crowding spillovers in the model has implications for the specification of the expenditure reaction function, since the neighbor's covariates (e.g., population, cost drivers) should now also be included in the equation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, the size of support is likely to vary with characteristics of each group member (citizen income levels or firm size). Third, the size of political support is predicted to vary with each group's organizational capacity [12,33]. Differences in organizational capacity determine a group's ability to mobilize its members, thus deterring free riding.…”
Section: Hypotheses About Chosen Levels Of Regulatory Effortmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11 Alternative theories of regulatory policymaking focus on the median voter or legislative controls or bureaucratic culture. 12 The literature identifies a wide range of determinants that may drive jurisdictional succession and fragmentation, including differences in their size [7,15], racial composition [3,6,18,28] and income [8]. In addition, economic theory predicts that economies of scale and differences in the preferred level of the public good will drive these decisions [29,39,40].…”
Section: Formulating Hypotheses About City Authority Seekingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The application of spatial correlation to the distribution of public services, and particularly the phenomenon of spatial spillover, has become a hotspot of research in analyses of public service efficiency (Feidler and Staal 2012). Correlational studies have revealed that interactions between public service expenditures by local governments can be driven by various effects, including 1) financial competition between regions (Besley and Coate 2003;Wilson and Wildasin 2004;Sheng and Fu 2006), 2) mimicking that is driven by yardstick competition (Thenbürger 2002;Frederico 2003;Gebremeskel 2012;Caldeira 2012), and 3) positive or negative spillovers (Dalhby 1994;Conley and Dix 1999;Sato 2000;Boadway 2001;Brueckner 2003). Both theory and causal observations suggest that expenditure spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by local governments (Ermini and Santolini 2010;Sole-Olle 2006).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%