Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review

Bubb, Ryan; Warren, Patrick L.

doi:10.1086/675258

Cited by 25 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…We focus on two design issues. Following Bubb and Warren (2014): the type of experts the journal editor will assign and whether to appoint a separate associate editor to review recommendations proposed by the panel of experts.…”

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The latter assumption implies that an extra 3 hours of work per week is tougher for a reviewer currently working 60 hours a week than for a referee currently working 30. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the effort-cost function ϕ(e) can be defined as (Bubb & Warren, 2014): φ e A e ( ) = 2 2 and thus it takes a quadratic form, where constant A is sufficiently large (see Figure 1). If the reviewer finds problems in a manuscript, he can then request (minor and/or major) revisions.…”

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As is common practice today, here we assume that reward systems or promotion-based incentives are not used to motivate the reviewer. In this article following Bubb and Warren (2014), we study a number of alternative designs that the journal editor might employ at the peer review stage: Assigned referees scrutinize the manuscript and determine the level of peer review stringency; assigned referees scrutinize the manuscript, but a separately appointed associate editor sets the level of peer review stringency; and the journal editor also determines the degree of peer review stringency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our analysis is based on the idea that biased scientific preferences can induce effort by otherwise weakly motivated reviewers. Bubb and Warren (2014) apply this insight to explain the use by the president of the United States of America of ideological bureaucrats at the regulatory agencies and centralized regulatory review.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bias and effort in peer review

García

Rodrı́guez-Sánchez

Fdez-Valdivia

2015

Asso for Info Science & Tech

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Here, we develop a theory of the relationship between the reviewer's effort and bias in peer review. From this theory, it follows that journal editors might employ biased reviewers because they shirk less. This creates an incentive for the editor to use monitoring mechanisms (e.g., associate editors supervising the peer review process) that mitigate the resulting bias in the reviewers' recommendations. The supervision of associate editors could encourage journal editors to employ more extreme reviewers. This theory helps to explain the presence of bias in peer review. To mitigate shirking by a reviewer, the journal editor may assign biased referees to generate information about the manuscript's quality and subject the reviewer's recommendations to supervision by a more aligned associate editor. IntroductionPeer review of articles that appear in academic journals is required by the scientific community, and articles are supposed to be selected for publication on the basis of merit and appropriateness alone. In some journals, after the manuscript has been received and deemed appropriate with respect to submission criteria, the journal editor assigns the manuscript to an associate editor. In such a case, the associate editor is usually responsible for the management of the peer review of manuscripts by members of the relevant research field. In other cases, academic journals are run by only one editor (unassisted, or with a managing editor who does not make editorial decisions). In some scholarly journals, rather than a single editor with several associate editors, multiple independent editors operate the journal, or there are editorial boards that decide about submissions. Nevertheless, the quality level of the journal is increased by assuring the selection of appropriate referees to identify high-quality articles and by efficiently managing the peer review process, (Burnham, 1990;Campanario, 1998aCampanario, , 1998b.Reviewers are identified through peer contact or references listed at the end of the manuscript. At some academic journals, authors are invited to nominate a minimum number of reviewers. Occasionally this is required by the submission system. Then, the associate editor will determine the disposition of the manuscript, based on the remarks of the reviewers, and his own assessment of the manuscript. The decision for a major or minor revision will be conveyed to the author by the associate editor. In general, novelty, quality of technical content, and appropriateness for publication are the criteria for the manuscript to be accepted. The goal of the peer review process is to seek fundamental knowledge and identify the most promising research. In many ideal depictions, peer review processes are understood as providing a "system of institutionalized vigilance in the self-regulation of knowledge communities" (Merton, 1973, p. 339), and thus "peer expertise is coordinated to vet the quality and feasibility of submitted work" (Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, & Cronin, 2013, p. 3). A description of the major findings in...

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Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bias and effort in peer review

García

Rodrı́guez-Sánchez

Fdez-Valdivia

2015

Asso for Info Science & Tech

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…7 This is referred to as a policy 'target' due to the fact that the likelihood outcomes are realized at this target is dependent on the agency's aforementioned effort investment in capacity. This will become clear in the model section.8 While I do not deal with the question of when bias may be preferable to slack in this article, see generallyBendor and Meirowitz (2004),Bubb and Warren (2014), and Van Weelden (2013) for different analyses of this trade-off.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%