Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty

Xu, Hao; Tan, Dan

doi:10.1007/s10614-019-09909-8

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Yan & Yang (2018) investigate the optimal licensing contract in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly market with non-drastic innovation and show that the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing when product substitution and technology spillover are both small. Xu & Tan (2019) deem that fixed-fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing considering both regions. Sen & Tauman (2018) believe that royalties are superior to fixed fees for the innovator.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

Chen¹,

Wei²,

Liu³

et al. 2021

JOC

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The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and production costs. This paper aims to reveal the competitiveness strategies of leaders and followers for innovation, technology sharing, and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market. The three-stage sequential game method is used to achieve the objective. The results are as follows. First, whether an enterprise uses innovation or shares technology is related to the fixed cost of innovation, the return on innovation, and product differentiation. It will hinder innovation activities if the fixed cost of innovation is too high, the return on innovation is too low, or the products are too homogeneous. A relatively low return on innovation makes it possible for the two enterprises to engage in sharing. However, with a relatively high return on innovation, only a high level of product differentiation can ensure technology sharing. Second, the optimal sharing fee is dynamic, showing an upward and then downward trend as the return on innovation grows. Product differentiation has an uncertain impact on the cost. Third, either the leader or the follower is likely to be the optimal bearer of social responsibility depending on the returns on innovation and product differentiation. This study has theoretical significance for optimizing technology-sharing decisions, improving competitiveness for enterprises, and formulating effective industrial policy for the government. And it provides some practical guidance for competition and cooperation between enterprises with technological innovation behavior.

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

Chen¹,

Wei²,

Liu³

et al. 2021

JOC

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“…In order to avoid students trying hard before the physical fitness test, the teacher's usual score [11] should also account for a certain proportion in the physical test results. Can assume τ Is the grade point linkage rate ( [13] and [25]) , then the student's physical test score converted from grade point can be expressed as…”

Section: According To [15] We Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of College Students' physical fitness test results considering process evaluation in Physical Education Teaching

Miao,

Chang,

Cheng

et al. 2024

Preprint

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With the development of the times, college students with a relatively loose living environment are facing a variety of temptations. College students often ignore the importance of physical exercise because of sedentary use of intelligent devices or some bad living habits, so that their physical quality decreases and can not meet the basic requirements of school physical fitness test. This trend has attracted the attention of all sectors of society, Many scholars have also conducted preliminary research on this phenomenon. Therefore, this paper establishes a dynamic game model from the perspective of economics, compares and analyzes any two students as the two sides of the game, and obtains the students' attitude towards physical testing by using two evaluation methods: process evaluation and final evaluation, Class sports atmosphere and the price paid for the physical test are the three control variables to optimize the physical test results. Through the reward and punishment scheme proposed by the process evaluation, students are encouraged to continuously strengthen physical exercise. When students have rich interest in sports, students will regard sports as a living habit, so as to effectively improve students' physical quality.

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“…One is that the pollution can be divided into short-and long-term impacts, another feature is that they explored a payment distribution mechanism. Xu and Tan [38] considered the abatement technology licensing between governments in two adjacent regions; in contrast, the current work considers the optimal environmental policy between the government and firms in two adjacent regions. Marsiglio and Masoudi [39] constructed a transboundary pollution control problem in a two-country differential game, they suggest that a universally homogeneous environmental tax may not be either desirable or optimal in spite of the non-cooperative and the cooperative solutions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading

Luo

2022

Sustainability

Self Cite

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Global environmental problems such as transboundary pollution and global warming have been recognized as major issues around the world. In practice, governments of all countries are actively exploring various environmental policies to control pollution. The government needs to consider the impact of neighboring regions when formulating environmental policies, especially in the context of transboundary pollution. However, the above problems are less studied, to bridge this gap and aim at solving problems in existing practices, we consider a differential game model of transboundary pollution control to examine which policy is more effective in promoting environmental quality and social welfare in a dynamic and accumulative global pollution context. Three alternative policy instruments, namely emission standards, emission taxes, and emission permit trading, are considered and compared. The results show that the social welfare of each region is the lowest and the total pollution stock is the highest under the emission tax policy due to the “rent-shifting,” “policy-leakage,” and “free-riding” effects. Moreover, the realized level of the environmental policy in the Nash equilibrium of the policy game is distorted away from the socially optimal level. The emission standards policy is found to be better than the emission tax policy and characterized by initiating the rent-shifting effect without the policy-leakage effect. Moreover, the pollution stock of two regions is found to be the lowest and the social welfare is found to be the highest under the emission permit trading policy, which is not associated with any of the three effects. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the results, and a sensitivity analysis is performed in the steady state.

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Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty

Cited by 12 publications

References 45 publications

Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

Analysis of College Students' physical fitness test results considering process evaluation in Physical Education Teaching

Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading

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