IEEE MILCOM 2004. Military Communications Conference, 2004.
DOI: 10.1109/milcom.2004.1494884
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Optical network security: technical analysis of fiber tapping mechanisms and methods for detection and prevention

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Cited by 78 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…To gain mid-span access to the fiber, the eavesdropper has to cut through and strip away the cable's outer jacket to access the individual fibers in its center. Once this is done, the eavesdropper has several ways to tap the optical signal, including fiber bending, optical splitting, evanescent coupling, V-groove cut, and optical scattering [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To gain mid-span access to the fiber, the eavesdropper has to cut through and strip away the cable's outer jacket to access the individual fibers in its center. Once this is done, the eavesdropper has several ways to tap the optical signal, including fiber bending, optical splitting, evanescent coupling, V-groove cut, and optical scattering [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since the interconnection network cables are often exposed to the outside of the system to connect multiple nodes packaged in one or several racks, they are vulnerable to the eavesdropping attack. Even optical networks are vulnerable to the attack through a simple fiber optic splitter or coupler [20]. To make servers resistant to this attack, it is necessary to provide the confidentiality service where all communications from processors are encrypted.…”
Section: Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The data transmitted via copper cables is highly insecure when compared to fiber optic communication. In some situations, the attacker accesses to the fiber cable and easily taps the data [3]. When the attacker utilizes a laptop, customized software, optical tap and an opto-electronic converter, then the attack will be not be easily identified.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%