Opposition in South Africa

Abstract

A STRIKING FEATURE OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE ‘NEW’ SOUTH Africa following the first democratic election in April 1994 was the widespread expectation that both the mechanism of transition and the electoral outcome in coalition government (the Government of National Unity: GNU) might serve as a model to other African regimes similarly placed. This may well be true with respect, for example, to the relevance of power-sharing arrangements of the kind that were built into South Africa's interim constitution in 1993, but as I shall explain, South Africa's experience of constitutional change and its outcome is best understood as sui generis. I am inclined to be sceptical about this assumption on the grounds that ‘models’ imported from elsewhere have not served Africa well; that the establishment of Westminster-style democratic structures in newly independent states in the 1950s and 1960s based on winner-take-all electoral systems failed to take into account historical and cultural differences — in particular the absence of anything resembling a Western-style tradition of democratic participation. Whether it could have served as a model, given the constraints of the time — loss of imperial will, insistent claims of indigenous nationalist elites etc. — is another matter. As Michael Oakeshott remarks: ‘[democracy] has been homegrown in Western society and to seek to transfer its beliefs and habits to an exotic soil will always be difficult.’

Opposition in South Africa: Issues and Problems

“…Despite the brutalities and racial exclusions of apartheid, ideas of constitutional government have had time to take root. 39 Hence the idea of opposition in South Africa is far from new. Furthermore, the 'pacted transition' was brought about by a trade-off that saw the ANC accept political power balanced by the continuing domination of the economy by white corporate capital.…”

The pitfalls of power sharing in a new democracy: the case of the National Party in South Africa

“…Lijphart (1998) states that it caused the ANC to concede ground on what formerly had been a position based on simple majoritarian democracy. Spence (1997) discusses the pragmatism underpinning the ANC's approach during the negotiations. He argues that the reason for the ANC's toleration of power sharing was due to its recognition that the NP had a crucial part to play if the transition was to begin on a more solid footing than would otherwise have been the case had it been excluded from executive-level decision making.…”

“…Had the negotiations established a Westminster-like ‘winner takes all’ electoral system rather than a power-sharing one then the NP (and the IFP) would have been excluded from government. Spence (1997: 529) explains: ‘Nelson Mandela and his ANC colleagues were willing to accept the principle of a constitutionally prescribed coalition largely because the ANC required cooperation from the NP if the loyalty of the bureaucracy and the security forces was to be guaranteed’ – a point that will be touched upon in the next section. Hence, as Spence points out, the ANC did not have much confidence in the idea of a ‘loyal opposition’ emerging from the 1994 elections and thought it wiser to work with the NP than risk the consequences of not doing so.…”

“…Neither did he speculate upon the electoral challenges of being involved in the GNU. Spence (1997) was clear that there were potential electoral dangers in the NP becoming too aligned with the ANC and thus too uncritical of ANC-led policies. Overall, the sharp decline in support for the NP between 1994 and 2004 speaks powerfully of voter alienation whilst the significant drop in electoral backing between 1994 and 1999 suggests that Spence's analysis was perceptive.…”

“…In terms of parliamentary seats this resulted in a very lopsided balance in favour of the – ANC, NP, IFP – coalition government. On this point Spence (1997: 529) comments: ‘The remaining political parties, with 23 parliamentary seats out of a total of 400, constituted the opposition.’ Clearly, those constituting the opposition were dwarfed by parties making up what Lijphart refers to as a grand coalition. Additionally, the opposition was fragmented.…”