Opportunism, governance structure and relational norms: An interactive perspective

Paswan, Audhesh K.; Hirunyawipada, Tanawat; Iyer, Pramod

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.04.012

Cited by 60 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…In particular, Paswan, Hirunyawipada, and Iyer () provide evidence supporting the arguments that greater mutual trust among parties, predictability and stability of rules and behaviors, and reciprocity, among others, contribute to reductions in partner opportunism. These corroborate closely with our deductions of the relational dynamics in Table .…”

mentioning

confidence: 80%

“…This would be countervailed by relational dynamics that encourage/enforce compliance, that is, there is effective interactive governance. Drawing on the seminal contributions of Jap and Anderson (2003), Cavusgil, Deligonul, and Zhang (2004), Caniëls and Gelderman (2010) and also Paswan, Hirunyawipada, and Iyer (2017), the degree of effective governance is inversely related to the extent of partner opportunism. 19 Table 3 amalgamates the analyses and arguments of the three study states, and evaluates the extent of opportunism between them.…”

Section: Measuring Governance Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"To boost RSBY implementation, Govt to hire independent agency," Indian Express, August 22, 2011. (http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/to-boost-rsby-implementation-govt-to-hire-independent-agency/)16 The preference for empaneling privately-run hospitals can also be ascribed to low trust in public medical facilities, where even the lowest income quintile of the population reportedly prefer private medical providers (International Institute for PopulationSciences & Macro International, 2007).17 This is because a smaller pool of enrollees necessitates larger claims for any level of expected profit, which is further inflated by rent-seeking.18 Alternatively, it could also signal the presence of structural issues, such as poor agenda setting and ambiguity of performance measurements, for example,Verbeeten (2008), but these were clearly absent in the RSBY.19 In particular,Paswan, Hirunyawipada, and Iyer (2017) provide evidence supporting the arguments that greater mutual…”

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confidence: 99%

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Interactive governance and implementation effectiveness in India's National Health Insurance Program

Maurya

Kwan

2018

Aust J Public Adm

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Many public sector programs, such as those directed at public health, are often multiagency tasks where structural incongruity in the program design is liable to emerge over time from changing operational requirements. Yet, successful implementation remains possible because of the interactions and relationships between implementation parties that encourage cooperation and collaboration despite incongruence in the program design. We examine how the dynamics of these interparty relationships influence implementation success in a comparative study of India's National Health Insurance Scheme. We find that implementation parties exhibiting support and complementarity in their interactions created a virtuous cycle of continually encouraging better performance and vice versa. Thus, our findings exhibit a distinct functionary role of interparty interactions and relationships for eliciting effective implementation and governance. The analysis also showcases the need for policy makers and policy designers to be cognizant of the inadvertent introduction of structural inconsistencies and veto points into program designs and their potential influence on implementation outcomes.

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mentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Measuring Governance Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interactive governance and implementation effectiveness in India's National Health Insurance Program

Maurya

Kwan

2018

Aust J Public Adm

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“…Diante o exposto, as empresas na tentativa de reduzir os custos de transação, utilizamse de instrumentos gerenciais, de natureza contábil, para possibilitar a troca de informações de custos e outras informações relevantes para o relacionamento entre empresas colaboradoras, já que a empresa não é, todavia, autossuficiente, necessitando participar de relações de interdependência em diferentes níveis e formas (FEHR, 2015;LIU et al, 2017;PASWAN; HIRUNYAWIPADA; IYER, 2017).…”

Section: 1unclassified

“…Nessas circunstâncias, se por um lado os entrevistados também destacam a confiança mútua como uma das salvaguardas (sendo uma salvaguarda relacional) e é possível perceber pelas evidências que de fato foi construída confiança no relacionamento, por outro lado, verifica-se que a confiança é parcial. Isso porque mecanismos formais de salvaguardas entre as partes foram adotados, certamente pelo risco de comportamento oportunista (WILLIAMSON, 1991(WILLIAMSON, , 1993PASWAN;HIRUNYAWIPADA;IYER, 2017). Williamson (1996) corrobora ao defender que não existe confiança pura, e assim, as transações sempre terão algum tipo de salvaguarda.…”

Section: Incentivos Para O Compartilhamentounclassified

Open-book accounting no relacionamento entre comprador e fornecedor no setor agroindustrial

Cardoso¹

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Business organizations are increasingly urged to work in a balanced way on aspects of economic efficiency in interorganizational relationships, seeking to optimize processes, eliminate waste, reduce costs and generate value, in order to present more advantageous results in a highly competitive environment. This context favors the use of collaborative approaches to cost management such as Interorganizational Cost Management (IOCM) and the practice of Open-Book Accounting (OBA). In this sense, the objective of this research was to identify how the OBA is practiced in the relationship between an agroindustrial company and one of its direct suppliers, from the TCE perspective. Methodologically, this is a unique case study, dyad approach, developed with an agroindustry buying company and one of its direct suppliers. For data collection, semi-structured interviews, document analysis and direct observation were used. Data analysis was performed through Content Analysis. The results evidenced that the OBA is applied bilaterally, with a high level of detailing information by the supplier, and eventually and at a low level of detail from the buyer. It was found that the OBA was not a practice since the beginning of the relationship and therefore was not imposed by the buyer. The process of sharing information through the OBA emerged from the moment the trust was established, which required time of relationship and commitment of the parts in the application of the "win-win" principle, with the opportunity to expand joint ventures and with an exclusively "very long-term" supply contract, thus reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior by the parts. It was verified, therefore, that trust was a prerequisite for the application of the OBA and that, from the more open sharing of information, there was an increase of benefits for both companies. Another finding relates to the fact that OBA is not applied in order to manage costs in the chain, but rather to support another tool, Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), mainly used for selection, negotiation and renegotiation with suppliers, and not necessarily for interorganizational cost management. With this, it was verified that there is development of joint activities, however these are punctual and eventual, like the use of the Value Engineering technique. Additionally, the results evidenced that the formal contract is the main safeguard of the relationship, although there are also relational safeguards, such as trust, which was perceived as partial. Finally, it was observed that the investment in specific assets by the supplier increased the bilateral dependence of the parts and the interest in establishing a contract of longer duration in order to minimize the risks involved in the relationship of both the purchasing company, which depends of the continuous supply of the product that integrates its production process, and of the supplier, who depends on the guarantee of a high volume of purchase of the supplied product, that justifies economically the investment made. It is conclude...

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Curbing members' opportunism in first‐tier and federated agricultural marketing cooperatives

et al. 2021

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Agricultural marketing cooperatives are of panoramic socioeconomic importance. As owners, decision‐makers, and suppliers, their members' opportunism is of great concern to their competitiveness. In this study, we analyze sthe impact of governance mechanisms on opportunism. We explore the nonlinear effects and differences between the memberships of first‐tier cooperatives and federated cooperatives. Empirical results show that not all the mechanisms are equally effective: effective mechanisms for first‐tier cooperatives memberships should be employed with lower intensity, whereas those effective for federated cooperatives memberships need a higher intensity of employment. The results of this study allow presenting theoretical and managerial implications in an underexplored field of research [EconLit Citations: D22, D23, P13, Q13].

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Opportunism, governance structure and relational norms: An interactive perspective

Cited by 60 publications

References 72 publications

Interactive governance and implementation effectiveness in India's National Health Insurance Program

Interactive governance and implementation effectiveness in India's National Health Insurance Program

Open-book accounting no relacionamento entre comprador e fornecedor no setor agroindustrial

Curbing members' opportunism in first‐tier and federated agricultural marketing cooperatives

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