Operations other than war: Implications for the us army

Abstract

RANDApproved for public release; distribution unlimited PREFACE This monograph was prepared as part of a project entitled "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)" carried out in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The purpose of this project was to assess how demographic changes will affect future conflict (limited conventional fighting as well as nonconventional fighting, e.g., insurgency) and U.S. Army combat (conventional and counterinsurgency) as well as noncombat missions (e.g., peacekeeping, civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief). In addition, it examined the range of potential new Army deployments in the less-developed world, including:• Army roles and missions in support of either unilateral or multinational deployment efforts;• Army roles and missions in postconfiict reconstitution and reconstruction;• Army roles and missions as part of, or in support of, peacekeeping operations.The first phase of the project focused on the effects of urbanization and population growth in the developing world and, more specifically, on the implications of these demographic trends for the Middle East and for the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations.iv Operations Other Than War: Implications for th e U.S. ArmyThe project's second phase included several case studies representing the range of missions and requirements the United States is likely to face in the future» paying particular attention to the following: Army roles and missions in providing relief and humanitarian assistance to refugees; involvement, and the implications of intervening, in internal ethnic conflicts; and peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in urban settings.This monograph was written for the project's final phase. It supports the suggestion that U.S. forces will continue to be involved in operations other than war» describes the operational requirements of such missions» and makes specific recommendations for the U.S. Army regarding doctrine» training» equipment, and force structure. It concludes by summarizing which kinds of operations other than war the United States has proven competence in and which are more difficult. This monograph should be of interest to officers of the Army Staff and its field operating agencies engaged in these issues.

Preparing for the Inevitable: NGO-Military Interactions in Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations

“…General (Retired) Maxwell Thurman asserted that the military education system does not prepare officers for operations or equip them with the in-depth knowledge that an officer needs to successfully interact with other agencies. 231 This sentiment is echoed by Jennifer Morrison Taw who states that, "Officers are not adequately educated about other agencies' missions or capabilities." 232 As a company grade officer progresses through the officer basic course (OBC) and captain's career courses (CCC), there are no tasks associated with gaining knowledge on the conduct of humanitarian assistance and peace operations or the culture, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs.…”

“…259 To adequately prepare for future MOOTW, the leader development system must be revised. 260 Although current doctrine and operational AARs clearly state that units selected for humanitarian assistance and peace operations should have several weeks of pre-deployment training, employment options or emerging crises may preclude any specific mission preparation. 261 Additionally, General Shinseki envisions force employment options worldwide without relying on any pre-deployment training.…”

“…90 They do not maintain large standing staffs, but can be expeditionary and are frequently able to respond quickly to developing conflicts. 91 While professional NGOs make extensive efforts to avoid hiring unqualified people, they occasionally hire greater amounts of motivation than competence and participants may lack any operational experience. 92 Consequently, the quality of NGO performance is highly dependent on the people they hire for a given operation.…”

Augmented Performance Environment for Enhancing Interagency Coordination in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations: Phase 2

“…Reflecting on willingness to engage in consensus building must include the concrete identification of the best or most likely alternative to collaboration. If one's best or most likely alternative to collaboration is more satisfactory than working with others, disengagement from the consensus building process is the most practical action, and is adopted by many civilians and military personnel acting in overlapping areas of operations (e.g., Taw, Agmon, & Davis, 1997). Reflecting on assumptions and expectations must involve self-assessment of one's cultural knowledge and bias, willingness to attend to group process, attitudes, and collective skills, as well as trust in others (Avery et al, 1981; see also Kiffin-Petersen & Cordery, 2003).…”

“…Five issues were created so that the exercises would be sufficiently complex to enable -horsetrading‖ (i.e., making concessions on lower-priority issues) in the effort to reach consensus. We relied heavily upon the professional literature on civil-military coordination [e.g., case studies (e.g., HASC, 2008;JCOA, 2006;McNerney, 2005McNerney, -2006 Oliker et al, 2004;Taw et al, 1997)] and current news articles (e.g., regular updates to U.S. Embassy websites for Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID project updates posted online, e.g., at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html, and New York Times online World news stories) to create issues that would be differentially important to the roles in each exercise (e.g., security vs. agribusiness). Although not excluded, we avoided making personal priorities the primary driver of differing opinions on the issues because the goal of the exercises was to foster better collaboration in light of the common differences due to organizational culture.…”