Operational Warfare at Sea

Vego, Milan

doi:10.4324/9780203889954

Cited by 27 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…According to Dr. Milan Vego, a key aspect of operational leadership is the ability of the commander to plan and conduct a campaign. 15 Greene demonstrated his ability to do this as he developed his strategy for the Southern campaign. In his estimate of the situation, Greene analyzed the battlespace, the enemy critical factors, the enemy center of gravity (COG), intermediate and ultimate objectives, and provided his commander's intent.…”

Section: How Greene Exercised Operational Leadershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

U.S. Army Research Laboratory Microelectromechanical System Electronically Scanned Antenna Testing at the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center

Polcawich¹,

Judy²,

Pulskamp³

et al. 2008

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. ii REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

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Section: How Greene Exercised Operational Leadershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

U.S. Army Research Laboratory Microelectromechanical System Electronically Scanned Antenna Testing at the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center

Polcawich¹,

Judy²,

Pulskamp³

et al. 2008

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“…The strategic center of gravity for the United States is typically the national will to fight, as the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight. 46 One of the most significant critical vulnerabilities of that center of gravity is casualty aversion, especially when the conflict does not involve protecting a vital national interest. 47 Using airpower as the main effort during certain phases of a conflict, with a smaller number of supporting ground forces, can reduce the threat to the U.S. strategic center of gravity.…”

Section: Ways -Determining the Ways Is An Important Aspect Of Operatimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ultimate Quarterback: How the Joint Force Commander Can Utilize the Air Component, Supported by the Ground and Special Forces Components, to Most Effectively and Efficiently Achieve Operational Objectives

Lasica¹

2008

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTDistribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. SUPPLEMENTARY:A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. ABSTRACTThe current U.S. military way of war is driven by a conventional, symmetric combat mindset. This immediately leads to designating the ground component as the main effort to achieve operational objectives against ground-centric adversaries. There may be, however, better options that would maximize combat potential to meet the operational objectives with the fewest losses in the least amount of time. One of those options would be for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to designate airpower as the main effort, using the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) as supporting commanders, when the situation warrants. Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are used to illustrate the validity of this concept.This operational concept would be appropriate in certain situations when the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has command and control of the preponderance of kill mechanisms to attack the enemy's center of gravity. The use of operational art through an Ends, Ways, Means, and Risks framework is examined to determine when the JFC should consider designating airpower as the main effort and what conditions the JFC should be alert for in order to use this concept. Changes across the entire Doctrine Organization Training Material Leadership Personnel Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum are required to codify this change to ensure JFCs have another accepted option to achieve operational objectives. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. SUBJECT TERMS Signature:__________________________ April 2008 AbstractThe current U

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“…In a conflict with the PRC, Taiwan's "will to fight" is its strategic center of gravity − the source of massed moral strength, whose degradation would have a decisive impact on Taiwan's ability to resist the enemy. 1 The PRC would attack this center of gravity though operations designed to disrupt Taiwan's economy, degrade its infrastructure, attrit its military defenses, and terrorize its population, thereby undermining Taiwan's national morale and bringing about a collapse of the will to fight.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…explains: "[T]here is no case in history in which a population made common cause with the attacker bombing them and killing their loved ones against their own government. "41 …”

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confidence: 99%

Can S/CRS Solve the United States Government's Interagency Coordination Challenges?

Bennett¹

2008

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information . That directive modified the national security policy formulation process. The goal of the amended process was to integrate the efforts of all elements of the United States' government more efficiently through a new office located inside the State Department and to mitigate the weaknesses demonstrated during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This monograph analyses the structure of the new office, The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) through the lens of two organizational theories: Axelrod and Cohen's complexity theory, and Walton and Dutton's Bureaucratic Conflict Resolution theory. The study assesses whether the new office is organized, staffed and empowered in a manner that will allow it to coordinate the interagency actors successfully in a crisis. An examination of recent reconstruction and stability operations determines which is more influential on the policy development process: the people involved or the processes used to develop policies. By determining which is more influential, people or process, the study determines if the modifications to the national security policy formulation process that NSPD-44 stipulates improve the federal government's ability to integrate interagency efforts in support of reconstruction and stability operations.The provisions of NSPD 44 and the capacity of S/CRS have not been tested in actual intergovernmental planning; therefore, it is not possible to assess the merits of the organization directly. However, it is possible to compare the extant organization theory with the organization and process associated with NSPD-44. Analysis of the data provided through interviews with S/CRS staff members, State Department and Department of Defense officials indicates that S/CRS staff members lack the experience of their peers throughout the interagency community and are therefore not able to coordinate the policy formulation effectively. Furthermore, the placement of S/CRS within the Department of State limits the ability of S/CRS officials to conduct their duties among their bureaucratic competitors in the interagency community. The assessment of the organization revealed that the S/CRS has been placed in a position to coordinate policy but has not been granted sufficient authority. The office is subordinate both F and the regional directorates and neither is willing to empower the S/CRS. The data indicate that S/CRS and the amended policy formulation process may develop efficient tactics, techniques and procedures t...

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Operational Warfare at Sea

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

U.S. Army Research Laboratory Microelectromechanical System Electronically Scanned Antenna Testing at the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center

U.S. Army Research Laboratory Microelectromechanical System Electronically Scanned Antenna Testing at the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center

The Ultimate Quarterback: How the Joint Force Commander Can Utilize the Air Component, Supported by the Ground and Special Forces Components, to Most Effectively and Efficiently Achieve Operational Objectives

Can S/CRS Solve the United States Government's Interagency Coordination Challenges?

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