Operation Safe Corridor Programme and Reintegration of Ex-Boko Haram Fighters in Nigeria

Abstract

The devastation of lives, livelihood and property in Nigeria caused by over a decade of insurgency by the Boko Haram terrorists is a subject of security, policy, humanitarian and academic concern. Several counter-measures have been adopted by both state and non-state actors to combat the insurgency with limited successes recorded. Consequently, studies have examined several efforts taken by the Nigerian government toward ending the Boko Haram insurgency, including the challenges confronting such efforts. However, Nigeria’s de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme for ex-Boko Haram fighters, known as Operation Safe Corridor, has received marginal attention in literature. The Operation Safe Corridor programme which was established in September 2015 is aimed at de-radicalizing, rehabilitating and reintegrating repentant Boko Haram insurgents into society. Using a field survey method involving key informant interviews and focus group discussions as well as documentary reports, this article examines the progress and pitfalls of the Operation Safe Corridor programme. It argues that the failure to mainstream the concerns of local communities both in policy and programming of Operation Safe Corridor severely undermines the prospect of successful and effective reintegration of ex-Boko Haram fighters. The article concludes that if this gap is not addressed, the programme will succeed in terms of the number of ex-combatants graduating from it but will fail in terms of reintegrating the graduating ex-combatants into society. This poses significant risks to both Boko Haram defectors and society at large.

Boko Haram, security architecture and counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria

“…Despite the challenges faced by the military-led counterinsurgency operations, the Nigerian government under President Buhari has continued to rehabilitate and reintegrate the so-called “repentant” Boko Haram members who were arrested and/or jailed by the relevant government authorities. The government justifies the reintegration of Boko Haram members under its Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) program based on the notion that they were forced into terrorism by the devastating and traumatic conditions they had faced (Adibe, 2020; Ugwueze et al, 2022). Following the release of 244 “repentant” and rehabilitated Boko Haram members to Borno State Government in Maiduguri, with some of them coming from Niger Republic (Haruna, 2020), the OSC reintegration program has continued to generate concerns within the Nigerian public space.…”

Community-Based Organizations and Stakeholders’ Engagements: A Dialectics of Countering Violent Extremism and Humanitarian Service Delivery in North-East Nigeria

“…The federal government's approach to solving problems like the CVE has not yielded the desired results since it has not fully integrated CBOs as significant partners (Anyadike, 2017). The recent federal government's 'Operation Safe Corridor' did not include CBOs (Ugwueze et al, 2021). According to Waldmann (2010), the lack of community participation in government CVE programmes may have a larger role in fostering the recruitment and radicalization of people into violent extremist groups, especially if the community is sympathetic to and reminiscent of certain insurgent groups.…”

“…The disregard for CSOs in government's CVE programmes and operations, according to Ugwueze and Onuoha (2020) and Ugwueze et al (2021), is counterproductive to addressing conditions that motivate violent extremism. Working with the state, according to Njoku (2020), has a negative influence on CSOs' efforts to checkmate and hold politicians responsible.…”

“…Despite this, CBOs’ participation in CVE programmes and activities has remained a fantasy. CSOs, notably CBOs, were left out of the de-radicalization, demobilization and reintegration process of the ‘repentant Boko Haram terrorists’ by the Nigerian government’s recent ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ soft approach to CVE (Ugwueze et al, 2021; Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020).…”