Opening Pandora’s Box? Joint Sovereignty and the Rise of EU Agencies with Operational Tasks

Abstract

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).

The establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: integration with limited supranationalisation?

“…Overall, however, the EPPO is unique and novel in terms of deep legally binding integration of core state powers (Trauner & Lavenex, 2015). It clearly goes beyond other EU agencies under direct member state control and with largely non-binding powers (Freudlsperger et al, 2022;Wolff, 2015).…”

“…Some scholars see de novo bodies as a way to continue close cooperation between member states without transferring extensive powers to supranational institutions: they present those bodies as cases of "integration without supranationalization" (Bickerton et al, 2015b, p. 706) and as operational expert bodies aimed at supporting cooperation between states (Wolff, 2015). However, the extent of operational tasks delegated to those bodies may amount to the exercise of "joint sovereignty" between the EU and member states (Freudlsperger et al, 2022).…”

European Border and Coast Guard standing corps. The establishment of a European border police

“…Against the backdrop of permanently perceived migration emergencies in the Member States and an under-regulation, the agency continuously exhausted or strategically exceeded its mandate: "[T]he agency [has] repeatedly triggered developments through numerous oversteps of competence that were later legalised" (Lehnert, 2014, 503, own translation) Campesi (2021, 147) pushes this argument even further and writes of an empirically observable hierarchy of Frontex over the national border guard units in the field. However, Freudlsperger, Maricut-Akbik andMigliorati (2022, 1984) appear accurate in their assessment that an "empirical trend" can be observed, which they call "the exercise of 'joint sovereignty' in the EU".…”

“…The complex balance of responsibilities between the agency and the states of operation can be illustrated by the example of the pushback allegations during various operations of the agency in Greek waters. The as yet unanswered question of whether Greece or Frontex should bear responsibility for alleged human rights violations at sea illustrates the impact of the de facto division of responsibility that has existed for years (Freudlsperger et al, 2022;1999). The legal problems associated with under-regulation were not addressed when the new standing corps was established.…”

Integrated Border Management between Kosovo and Serbia: Protecting Sovereignty and the EU Agenda

“…capacities by two levels of governance (the EU and national actors) at the same time." (Freudlsperger et al, 2022(Freudlsperger et al, , p. 1990). As explained above, the IBM agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was an integral part of the political process related to the agreement on freedom of movement.…”