Open shop scheduling games

Atay, Ata; Calleja, Pedro; Soteras, Sergio

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2021.02.030

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Atay et al [27] studied open-shop scheduling problems to minimize the total completion times. They proposed a cooperative TU game and allocate the affected jobs for each alliance to minimize the makespan.…”

Section: Schedulingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Game Theory Models to Support Production Planning, Scheduling, Cloud Manufacturing and Sustainable Production Systems

Renna

2024

Designs

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Cyber-physical systems, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and big data play significant roles in shaping digital and automated landscape manufacturing. However, to fully realize the potential of these technologies and achieve tangible benefits, such as reduced manufacturing lead times, improved product quality, and enhanced organizational performance, new decision support models need development. Game theory offers a promising approach to address multi-objective problems and streamline decision-making processes, thereby reducing computational time. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date systematic review of the literature on the application of game theory models in various areas of digital manufacturing, including production and capacity planning, scheduling, sustainable production systems, and cloud manufacturing. This review identifies key research themes that have been explored and examines the main research gaps that exist within these domains. Furthermore, this paper outlines potential future research directions to inspire both researchers and practitioners to further explore and develop game theory models that can effectively support the digital transformation of manufacturing systems.

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Section: Schedulingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Game Theory Models to Support Production Planning, Scheduling, Cloud Manufacturing and Sustainable Production Systems

Renna

2024

Designs

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“…In order to determine the maximal cost savings of a coalition T ⊆ N, we have to define which rearrangements are admissible. Various assumptions have been made on admissible rearrangements of the initial schedule, see Curiel et al (1993), Slikker (2006b), Musegaas et al (2015), and Atay et al (2021), among others. Following the literature, we consider two approaches to define admissible rearrangements to study the non-emptiness of the core for requeuing games with an endogenous number of machines.…”

Section: Private Requeueing Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, we take a game theoretical approach to address the question on how to distribute among the players the proceeds of their cooperation, whenever they (re)schedule their jobs to be processed in an optimal way, minimizing total costs. Following the vast literature on different problems on rescheduling an initial queue (see for instance Calleja et al, 2002;Musegaas et al, 2015;Bahel and Trudeau, 2019;Atay et al, 2021), we examine conditions guaranteeing the existence of stable allocations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines

Atay¹,

Trudeau²

2022

Preprint

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This paper studies queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines with and without an initial queue, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but also on how many machines. For a given problem, agents can (de)activate as many machines as they want, at a cost. After minimizing the total cost (processing costs and machine costs), we use a game theoretical approach to share to proceeds of this cooperation, and study the existence of stable allocations. First, we study queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines, and examine how to share the total cost. We provide an upper bound and a lower bound on the cost of a machine to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core (the set of stable allocations). Next, we study requeueing problems with an endogenous number of machines, where there is an existing queue. We examine how to share the cost savings compared to the initial situation, when optimally requeueing/changing the number of machines. Although, in general, stable allocation may not exist, we guarantee the existence of stable allocations when all machines are considered public goods, and we start with an initial schedule that might not have the optimal number of machines, but in which agents with large waiting costs are processed first.

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General Open Shop Scheduling

Kubiak

2021

International Series in Operations Research &Amp; Management Science

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Open shop scheduling games

Cited by 11 publications

References 15 publications

A Review of Game Theory Models to Support Production Planning, Scheduling, Cloud Manufacturing and Sustainable Production Systems

A Review of Game Theory Models to Support Production Planning, Scheduling, Cloud Manufacturing and Sustainable Production Systems

Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines

General Open Shop Scheduling

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