“…The emergence of online information threats 1 has fundamentally changed the view of cyberspace as a democratizing force (Kiggins, 2015: 102). Today, the contemporary political debate in democratic societies routinely discusses online misinformation, disinformation, and deception, as security issues in urgent need of attention.…”
The contemporary debate in democracies routinely refers to online misinformation, disinformation, and deception, as security-issues in need of urgent attention. Despite this pervasive discourse, however, policymakers often appear incapable of articulating what security means in this context. This paper argues that we must understand the unique practical and normative challenges to security actualized by such online information threats, when they arise in a democratic context. Investigating security-making in the nexus between technology and national security through the concept of “cybersovereignty,” the paper highlights a shared blind spot in the envisaged protection of national security and democracy in cyberspace. Failing to consider the implications of non-territoriality in cyberspace, the “cybersovereign” approach runs into a cul de sac. Security-making, when understood as the continuous constitution of “cybersovereign” boundaries presumes the existence of a legitimate securitizing actor; however, this actor can only be legitimate as a product of pre-existing boundaries. In response to the problems outlined, the article proposes an alternative object of protection in the form of human judgment and, specifically, “political judgment” in the Arendtian sense. The turn to political judgment offers a conceptualization of security that can account for contemporary policy practises in relation to security and the online information threat, as well as for the human communicating subject in the interactive and essentially incomplete information and communication environment.
“…The emergence of online information threats 1 has fundamentally changed the view of cyberspace as a democratizing force (Kiggins, 2015: 102). Today, the contemporary political debate in democratic societies routinely discusses online misinformation, disinformation, and deception, as security issues in urgent need of attention.…”
The contemporary debate in democracies routinely refers to online misinformation, disinformation, and deception, as security-issues in need of urgent attention. Despite this pervasive discourse, however, policymakers often appear incapable of articulating what security means in this context. This paper argues that we must understand the unique practical and normative challenges to security actualized by such online information threats, when they arise in a democratic context. Investigating security-making in the nexus between technology and national security through the concept of “cybersovereignty,” the paper highlights a shared blind spot in the envisaged protection of national security and democracy in cyberspace. Failing to consider the implications of non-territoriality in cyberspace, the “cybersovereign” approach runs into a cul de sac. Security-making, when understood as the continuous constitution of “cybersovereign” boundaries presumes the existence of a legitimate securitizing actor; however, this actor can only be legitimate as a product of pre-existing boundaries. In response to the problems outlined, the article proposes an alternative object of protection in the form of human judgment and, specifically, “political judgment” in the Arendtian sense. The turn to political judgment offers a conceptualization of security that can account for contemporary policy practises in relation to security and the online information threat, as well as for the human communicating subject in the interactive and essentially incomplete information and communication environment.
“…Nesse ponto, dedicamos atenção às políticas dos EUA para a governança da internet comercial e o papel assumido pelo setor privado. Para tanto, utilizamos como base trabalhos que tratam sobre esse contexto do advento da internet comercial, como o de Tarnoff (2016), Kiggins (2015) e Assis (2020), ao mesmo tempo em que ilustramos o debate apresentando trechos dos documentos oficiais dos EUApublicados durante o governo de Bill Clinton (1993Clinton ( -2000, como o Telecommunications Act (1996) e o Framework for Global Eletronic Commerce (1997) -, e do posicionamento de representantes do setor privado e da sociedade civil, que tiveram um papel ativo nesse período.…”
Section: Metodologia E Organização Dos Capítulosunclassified
Ainda que o trabalho seja individual, a pesquisa é uma atividade que resulta da troca e do coletivo. Assim, nesse espaço, aproveito para agradecer as pessoas que, de alguma forma, contribuíram para a realização desta tese. Ao Prof. Mariutti, pela orientação e por respeitar o meu tempo. Às professoras e professores convidados para compor a banca, pela leitura atenta, pelos comentários e pelo diálogo.Às professoras, professores, funcionárias e funcionários do Programa San Tiago Dantas e da Unicamp por mostrarem que a academia pode (e deve) ser um local de parcerias.Às amigas e amigos que me acompanharam e me apoiaram nessa jornada: Giovanna,
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