Opaque Updates

Cohen, Michael

doi:10.1007/s10992-020-09571-8

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…In my account of inexact updates, these two axioms fail. This is important, as it suggests that within externalism, reasoning about epistemic updates is not transparent, but opaque (Cohen 2020b). This should make sense: updates behave differently at the good and bad case, and when we don't know whether we are in the good case, there is no reason to assume that the update will behave in the ways we expect.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection

Cohen

2021

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Cases of inexact observations have been used extensively in the recent literature on higher-order evidence and higher-order knowledge. I argue that the received understanding of inexact observations is mistaken. Although it is convenient to assume that such cases can be modeled statically, they should be analyzed as dynamic cases that involve change of knowledge. Consequently, the underlying logic should be dynamic epistemic logic, not its static counterpart. When reasoning about inexact knowledge, it is easy to confuse the initial situation, the observation process, and the result of the observation; I analyze the three separately. This dynamic approach has far reaching implications: Williamson's influential argument against the KK principle loses its force, and new insights can be gained regarding synchronic and diachronic introspection principles.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…InCohen (2020b), I develop a more general logic for inexact and opaque updates, which can also be used to model the example analyzed here.23 Note that both standard DEL and standard Bayesian update lack this property. Such updates are insensitive to the world of evaluation.…”

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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection

Cohen

2021

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“…DELAS. 6 As in [1], we can compose two event models into one. With event models, we can capture non-trivial de re dynamics.…”

Section: Definition 19 (Language Of Delas)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The non-global nature of de re updates comes from the assignments which only record the local value. This is also related to logics of local announcements[3] and to the study of opaque updates whose result is not always antecedently known to the agent[6].…”

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confidence: 99%

De Re Updates

Cohen

Tang

Wang

2021

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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In this paper, we propose a lightweight yet powerful dynamic epistemic logic that captures not only the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge but also the distinction between de dicto and de re updates. The logic is based on the dynamified version of an epistemic language extended with the assignment operator borrowed from dynamic logic, following the work of Wang and Seligman [35]. We obtain complete axiomatizations for the counterparts of public announcement logic and event-model-based DEL based on new reduction axioms taking care of the interactions between dynamics and assignments.

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“…59-60) writes: "Under all but the most ideal circumstances, agents will have reasons to suspect that future failures of conditionalization are in store".Pettigrew (2020) points out that standard arguments for conditionalization assume 'deterministic updating' and so leave no room for uncertainty about how you will update Lederman (2015). draws on failures of common knowledge that we will conditionalize to construct counterexamples to Aumann's claim that rational agents cannot 'agree to disagree' Cohen (2020). discusses uncertainty about updating in the context of epistemic logic.Christensen (2007, p. 3) defends the broader claim that "even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact".…”

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confidence: 99%

Rational Aversion to Information

Neth

2023

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1966) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.

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Opaque Updates

Cited by 5 publications

References 38 publications

Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection

Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection

De Re Updates

Rational Aversion to Information

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