Ontognoseological limites of intuition in the structure of cognitive and creative activity

Abstract

The article analyzes ontological and epistemological limits of intuitive cognition in the structure of cognitive and creative activity. To conduct a philosophical analysis of the concept of intuition, dialectic, descriptive and comparative methods are used. This analysis is necessary to identify ontological and epistemological aspects of intuitive cognition. The study of ontognoseological limits of intuitive knowledge is of particular interest for understanding the specifics of the invention problem, as well as the essence of the thinking process as such. Intuition, having ontognoseological limits, allows you to create and design inventions. Intuition is a basic attribute of the creative process. The key concepts used in the article are P.K. Engelmeyer, N. Hartmann, Ayn Rand, and I.D. Levin. The basic definition of intuition formulated by Engelmeyer points to the fundamental attribute of intuitive cognition -the creation of a new one through work with experience. Thus, intuition acts as a transitional link between feeling, reason and mind. In the concept of Engelmeyer, the structure of the creating process an invention is declared. The attributive structure of intuitive cognition, built on the basis of the Hartmann and Levin concepts (intuition of contemplation, intuition of an idea, selfconscious intuition, intuition of assumption), constructs a scheme of functioning of intuition as such. In the concepts of Hartmann and Ayn Rand, intuitive cognition appears as a rational form of grasping the existing. Hartmann, Ayn Rand, and Levin, singling out the properties of rational cognition in intuition, denote the ontognoseological boundaries of intuitive cognition. Basic parameters and attributive structure of intuitive knowledge were derived. Understanding the specifics of intuitive knowledge allows creating a holistic view of the process of thinking in general.