Recently, in Sci. Rep. 6 (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.'s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.'s scheme can be viewed as an incrementally (but incorrectly) modified version of the existing schemes based on Goldenberg Vaidman (GV) subroutine.Recently, Li et al. 1 have proposed a one step scheme for quantum key distribution (QKD) using a Bell states. The scheme is not secure and the claims made by the authors unfortunately appear to be inaccurate for various reasons as elaborated in this comment. Firstly, they claimed their scheme to be novel and tried to support their claim by stating "Compared with the "Pingpong" protocol involving two steps, the proposed protocol does not need to store the qubit and only involves one step". This is a comparison of an apple with an orange, as the Pingpong protocol is designed for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC), where information can be transmitted using quantum resources without the prior generation of keys. Naturally, a scheme of QKD should not be compared with a scheme of QSDC. To visualize the naiveness of their claim and part of the exercises followed in their paper, one may note that even the well known BB84 2 and B92 3 protocols for QKD do not require quantum memory, if one wishes to design BB84 type scheme using EPR states, Alice can simply prepare some copies of Bell states (sayand send the second qubits of all the Bell pairs to Bob, who subsequently randomly measures his qubit in X basis or Z basis. Alice also performs the same measurement and they keep all those cases where the measurement basis used by them are the same. For eavesdropping check they may compare half the results, if no signature for eavesdropping is found their key will be exactly correlated. A scheme equivalent to this scheme, which is one step and uses EPR state, is discussed by some of the present authors as Protocol 2 in, 4 where to increase the efficiency, Bob used to announce his basis and Alice used to subsequently measure in the same basis. However, such a scheme is neither efficient (as it uses costly quantum resource, like entanglement, which is not required) nor novel (as the scheme is equivalent to BB84). The one step EPR-based scheme proposed by Li et al., is slightly different from this simple minded EPR-based one step scheme of QKD described above as in this case Bob performs Bell measurement. In what follows we would show that security of such a scheme appears from entanglement swapping. Unfortunately, Li et al., missed this point and analyzed the security of their protocol in analogy with BB84 scheme, and naturally such an incorrect analysis led to incorrect values of error rates. Bef...