One size fits all? Designer-institutions: Lessons from two flawed attempts in Malawi

Abstract

This article observes two examples of attempted institutional design in Malawi's central region, Kasungu. In both cases external development actors enter local communities, and establish infrastructure to exploit two common sources of water. One is the exploitation of a river for group irrigation, the other a borehole to facilitate appropriation from a source of ground water. In both cases the infrastructure is accompanied by elaborate schemes of governance, ignoring the pre-existing social and bio-physical traits of the area. The results are two non-robust systems, collapsing under the weight of latent conflicts fuelled by the areas pre-existing institutional and bio-physical configuration. Using the framework of robustness in Social-Ecological Systems as a practical-analytical tool, the entities of the two systems are identified and their failure illustrated. The particular lessons drawn from the two cases are transformed into five general points meant to stimulate both development practitioners and future research endeavors.

The evolution of norms and their influence on performance among self-governing irrigation systems in the Southwestern United States

“…This study has implications for CPR governance in both developed and developing countries, in particular governance of irrigation systems under water stress (Skjølsvold 2010). It also generates new questions about the role of norms in an increasingly integrated economy where CPR use and governance are local but products of the CPR are sold in a global market (Randhir 2016).…”

“…average crop growth) and social cohesion (e.g. water use violations, crop production equality) (Skjølsvold 2010;Hoogesteger 2015). In an era of climate change, interventions need to be carefully coordinated with the target community in order to diagnose specific problems that can be solved while maintaining adaptive norms (Meinzen-Dick 2014).…”

“…From a governance perspective, norms influence the efficacy of external interventions and shape how local resource users respond to shocks, including price fluctuations, climate-related events, and external governance interventions (Kinzig et al 2013;Rode et al 2015;Roth et al 2015). Without a better understanding of how norms and multiple sources of authority work in a CPR, governance actors may make decisions that undermine the sustainability of CPRs and harm adaptation to climate change (Brunsa et al 2001;Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002;Skjølsvold 2010;Hoogesteger 2015). In the case of irrigation systems, this could lead to food insecurity, mass migration, and conflict (Gleick 2014;Meinzen-Dick 2014).…”