Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences

Abstract

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects-effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.

Switching Tracks? Towards a Multidimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology

“…18,21,33,34). Importantly, however, even researchers who do not operate within the DPM framework routinely present sacrificial dilemmas research as capturing the core contrast between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical approaches, and often make seemingly general claims about the psychological factors and processes that drive 'utilitarian judgment' [30,31], and attribute utilitarian tendencies to individuals [24,32] and specific populations [33,34].…”

“…Research employing sacrificial dilemmas regularly report findings about the processes driving or influencing 'utilitarian' judgment [17,20,30,31,61] as well as about the utilitarian tendencies of certain populations [32][33][34]62]. Such claims can suggest a generality and in some cases-as in the initial statements of the DPM-are clearly intended to have such general scope [28,63; though more recent formulations of the DPM are more qualified; see 21].…”

Distrusting Your Moral Compass: The Impact of Distrust Mindsets on Moral Dilemma Processing and Judgments

“…Therefore, the dual-process model is better conceptualized as a competition between relatively affect-laden tendencies to reject harm and relatively cognitive tendencies to accept harm to maximize outcomes that require similar processing time. Although experimental manipulations certainly influence responses (e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012), people typically prefer one or the other response by default (Helzer et al, 2016), and stable individual differences reliably predict dilemma judgments (e.g., Bartels, 2008). Thus, not all people may experience strong conflict when encountering dilemmas; many may simply select their default dilemma choice unless they have reason to carefully consider the alternative.…”

Emotion emphasis effects in moral judgment are moderated by mindsets

“…Implemental mindsets are typically activated when individuals have already reached a goal decision and start to plan out its implementation. Helzer et al (2017) have shown that individual differences in moral dilemma judgments are relatively stable. Thus, people seem to have a trait-like disposition to favor either utilitarianism or deontology.…”