2007
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00024.x
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On Williamson’s Argument for (Ii) in His Anti‐Luminosity Argument

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Cited by 5 publications
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“…In particular, Wong's defence of (MAR) does not appeal to a safety condition on knowledge, which Williamson clearly intends to be part of the justification for (MAR). 6 There is no standard presentation of Williamson's argument in the literature, so (MAR), or its analogues in terms of possible worlds and times (rather than in the terminology of world-bound cases), is variously labelled (I i ) (Williamson 2000;Weatherson 2004;Blackson 2007;Ramachandran 2009); (R) (Vogel 2010); (C) (Wong 2008); (1) (Cohen 2010); and (KMAR) (Zardini forthcoming). I borrow (MAR) from Berker (2008).…”
Section: The Problem With (Mar)mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…In particular, Wong's defence of (MAR) does not appeal to a safety condition on knowledge, which Williamson clearly intends to be part of the justification for (MAR). 6 There is no standard presentation of Williamson's argument in the literature, so (MAR), or its analogues in terms of possible worlds and times (rather than in the terminology of world-bound cases), is variously labelled (I i ) (Williamson 2000;Weatherson 2004;Blackson 2007;Ramachandran 2009); (R) (Vogel 2010); (C) (Wong 2008); (1) (Cohen 2010); and (KMAR) (Zardini forthcoming). I borrow (MAR) from Berker (2008).…”
Section: The Problem With (Mar)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin‐for‐error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires a plausible interpretation of the safety requirement together with other implausible, often soritical, assumptions (Leitgeb ; Weatherson ; Blackson ; Wong ; Berker ; Ramachandran ; Vogel ; Cohen ; Zardini forthcoming). Either way, the margin‐for‐error premise, and thus the anti‐luminosity argument, is in trouble.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“… For example, (Leitgeb, 2002, 202ff. ), (Blackson, 2007, 204–205), (Berker, 2008, §4), (Ramachandran, 2009, §VI), (Cohen, 2010, 726), and (Zardini, 2012, §6ff. ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%