On unconscious inhibition: Instantiating repression in the brain

Abstract

In psychodynamic theory, repression is a major neurotic defence mechanism, which operates by separating the drive investment from the conflictual representation. While major insights in unconscious processing have recently been obtained in the cognitive neurosciences, repression as a psychological mechanism remains controversial. In this chapter, we present empirical results obtained with subliminal priming paradigms concerning unconscious inhibition of (1) mental representations and (2) motor control. For these paradigms, we propose that only under very stringent subliminal conditions where stimuli are completely undetectable, the dynamics of deep unconscious processing -which are structurally sensitive to subject factors such as defensivity and anxiety -are discernable. We also present parallel results of (3) suppression and inhibition in memory and language processing. A similar observation in these various results is that inhibition reveals itself by spilling over to associated elements which were not its original targets. Finally, we propose a speculative model on the physiology of repression. First, we present a series of arguments indicating a conceptual closeness between the 'indications of reality' in the Freudian model and the efference copies of the sensorimotor models. Moreover, a number of other parallels between the psychodynamic and the sensorimotor approach have been uncovered in recent neurosciences, chief among which is the constitutive link between representation and action: thinking is only possible as a motor activity and this thinking is not a priori conscious. Afferent stimuli probe for a multiplicity of associated action plans: directed action, then, is only possible by selecting one alternative through inhibition of the others. This inhibition might function through the anticipative attenuation brought about by the efference copies. The efference copy-induced somatosensory activations linked to motor control are thought to induce mental imagery in response to incomplete action execution. This, then, would be especially the case for some of these action alternatives, which are easily susceptible of popping up due to their emotional importance. In order to act appropriately, these frequent candidates require a more vigorous inhibition, which would then be particularly prone to induce (unconscious) mental imagery as well as to spill over to associated representations and induce substitutive behaviours, which, together, would constitute 'the return of the repressed'.

On the physiology of jouissance: interpreting the mesolimbic dopaminergic reward functions from a psychoanalytic perspective

“…We previously proposed physiological frameworks to understand a number of psychoanalytic concepts like repression and primary process, as well as the Lacanian concept of the signifier (Bazan, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012; Bazan and Snodgrass, 2012). The topic of the present paper will be another Lacanian concept, jouissance , which is quite untranslatable but has been translated before as enjoyment (Evans, 1996).…”

Alpha synchronization as a brain model for unconscious defense: An overview of the work of Howard Shevrin and his team

“…Previously, we have proposed, based on several lines of reasoning, that the efference copy‐mediated attenuation mechanism is a possible neurophysiological functional principle for repression (Bazan, ; Bazan and Snodgrass, ). One main argument for this proposed mechanism comes from observations in psychosis, including intensive clinical work of the author with psychotic patients (Bazan, ).…”

“…Hafed and Krauzlis, 2006;Haggard and Whitford, 2004;Niziolek et al, 2013), but also to consciously suppress unwanted memories (Anderson and Levy, 2009). This attenuation mechanism then plays out more typically psychodynamic characteristics especially for highly invested, or highly emotionally charged, (articulation) movement sequences which need to be more permanently attenuated (and which, for that reason induce rebound phenomena; see Bazan, 2012;Bazan and Snodgrass, 2012).…”

Harnessing psychoanalytical methods for a phenomenological neuroscience

“…Other research in neuropsychoanalysis fits with the preclinical cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. These investigations aim to develop models of the brain that accommodate and illuminate psychoanalytic phenomena such as repression (Bazan and Snodgrass, 2012), libido (Pfaff and Fisher, 2012), the dynamic unconscious (Shevrin et al, 1996; Berlin, 2011; Solms and Zellner, 2012), and dreaming (Zellner, 2013). As the investigatory domain of contemporary neuropsychoanalysis grows, so does the variety of empirical approaches: from neuroimaging techniques to experimental behavioral methods and animal studies (Fotopoulou et al, 2012).…”