On Thermonuclear War

Kahn, Herman

doi:10.4324/9781315125701

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…As Kahn noted, there has to be an alternative to the wholly negative choice between oblivion and surrender. 55 Strategy must be enforced even in the most inauspicious of circumstances. Thus, driven by the need to prevail and retain rational purpose to nuclear conflict, warfighting is the answer.…”

Section: Unrestrained Theory Of Victorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

Lonsdale

2019

Comparative Strategy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents a significant shift in US nuclear weapons policy. Using Cold War vintage theory, this paper assesses whether the NPR signals a return to nuclear warfighting. The NPR is assessed against five primary drivers for warfighting strategy: enhanced deterrence; to deal with deterrence failure; to maximize damage limitation; to provide a theory of victory; adherence to Just War. The paper concludes that although the NPR represents a step in the direction of warfighting, it does not fully embrace it. This is primarily because the NPR fails to endorse an unrestrained theory of victory.

show abstract

Section: Unrestrained Theory Of Victorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

Lonsdale

2019

Comparative Strategy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Longer time horizons sacrifice immediacy, but relax the strictures of "what is possible" and so invite and enable stretch thinking. One of the early proponents of scenario planning, Herman Kahn, referred to scenarios as "thinking the unthinkable" (Kahn, 1960), that is, giving specific attention to outcomes at the limits of plausibility. Scenarios are built to provoke thinking and stimulate conversations, that is, to "ideate" in design thinking terms.…”

Section: Prospectingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2019

TIM Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Volume 9 Issue 8Overview The Technology Innovation Management Review (TIM Review) provides insights about the issues and emerging trends relevant to launching and growing technology businesses. The TIM Review focuses on the theories, strategies, and tools that help small and large technology companies succeed.Our readers are looking for practical ideas they can apply within their own organizations. The TIM Review brings together diverse viewpoints -from academics, entrepreneurs, companies of all sizes, the public sector, the community sector, and others -to bridge the gap between theory and practice. In particular, we focus on the topics of technology and global entrepreneurship in small and large companies. We welcome input from readers into upcoming themes. Please visit timreview.ca to suggest themes and nominate authors and guest editors.

show abstract

“…Para uma apresentação mais abrangente, veja-se o alentado volume de Freedman (2003); visões alternativas podem ser encontradas em Kaplan (1983) e Gavin (2012). As referências clássicas são Wohlstetter (1959); Schelling (2003Schelling ( [1960;1966), Kahn (1961a;1961b;1965); Brodie (1959). Para uma extraordinária revisão mais recente, v. Delpech (2011).…”

Section: A Estrutura Materials Da Dissuasão Nuclearunclassified

Armamentos Nucleares: Dissuasão e Guerra Nuclear Acidental

Diniz

2016

Carta Int. ABRI

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ResumoAborda-se o problema dos supostos benefícios à segurança internacional que adviriam da eventualidade de que aumentasse a quantidade de Estados nuclearmente armados, em função do alegado valor dissuasório que lhes seria intrínseco. A questão é discutida integrando-se as literaturas sobre dissuasão e sobre os riscos de guerras nucleares impremeditadas, articuladas pela discussão das necessidades técnicas e estratégicas de procedimentos e recursos de Comando e Controle (C2), incluindo os aspectos relacionados a alerta antecipado e capacidade efetiva, segura e garantida de lançar um ataque caso se decida fazê-lo. Expõem-se os componentes de uma capacidade nuclear plena; as condições necessárias para que possa haver uma dissuasão nuclear mútua e estável em oposição aos incentivos para um primeiro ataque e aos riscos de "lançamento-ao-primeiro-sinal"; e, em 10Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 11, n. 1, 2016, p. 9-62 Armamentos Nucleares: Dissuasão e Guerra Nuclear Acidental que medida, tais dinâmicas podem ou não contribuir para uma maior estabilidade política. A conclusão geral é que, na ausência de capacidades de C2 e de alerta antecipado robustas, complexas, avançadas e caríssimas, a segurança de um país é na verdade diminuída pela obtenção de armamentos nucleares, e o risco de guerras nucleares impremeditadas aumenta significativamente; além disso, contrariamente à sabedoria convencional, todos esses perigos são ainda maiores para países pequenos ou pobres que para países grandes ou ricos. Armamentos nucleares, por si mesmos, não diminuem a diferença entre ricos e pobres; ao contrário, aumentam-na.Palavras-chave: Dissuasão; Guerra Acidenta; Estabilidade Nuclear; Armamentos Nucleares; Proliferação Nuclear; Comando e Controle Nucleares AbstractThe text approaches the issue about the desirability of nuclear-weapon proliferation for its alleged intrinsic deterrent capabilities, integrating the issue of inadvertent nuclear war, by connecting both literatures with the technical and strategic needs for Command and Control (C2), including aspects related to early warning and reliable, secure launching. It addresses the elements of a complete nuclear capacity; the necessary conditions for a stable, mutual nuclear deterrence, against the incentives for a first nuclear strike and the risks of launch-on-warning; and to what extent those dynamics contribute, or not, for greater political stability. The overall conclusion is that, in the absence of robust, very complex and advanced, expensive, secure C2 and early-warning capabilities, a country's security is actually decreased by acquiring nuclear weapons, and the danger of inadvertent nuclear wars is significantly enhanced; contrary to conventional wisdom, all these dangers are still more pronounced for smaller, poorer countries than for large, wealthier ones. Nukes themselves are not equalizers, quite the contrary.Keywords: Deterrence; Accidental War; Nuclear Stability; Nuclear Weapons; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Command and Control Rev. Carta Inter., Belo H...

show abstract

On Thermonuclear War

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

Untitled

Armamentos Nucleares: Dissuasão e Guerra Nuclear Acidental

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About