On the Value of Alert Systems and Gentle Rule Enforcement in Addressing Pandemics

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic poses a major challenge to policy makers on how to encourage compliance to social distancing and personal protection rules. This paper compares the effectiveness of two policies that aim to increase the frequency of responsible health behavior using smartphone-tracking applications. The first involves enhanced alert capabilities, which remove social externalities and protect the users from others’ reckless behavior. The second adds a rule enforcement mechanism that reduces the users’ benefit from reckless behavior. Both strategies should be effective if agents are expected-value maximizers, risk averse, and behave in accordance with cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) or in accordance with the Cognitive Hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004). A multi-player trust-game experiment was designed to compare the effectiveness of the two policies. The results reveal a substantial advantage to the enforcement application, even one with occasional misses. The enhanced-alert strategy was completely ineffective. The findings align with the small samples hypothesis, suggesting that decision makers tend to select the options that lead to the best payoff in a small sample of similar past experiences. In the current context, the tendency to rely on a small sample appears to be more consequential than other deviations from rational choice.

Factors Influencing the Adoption of Contact Tracing Applications: Systematic Review and Recommendations

“…Another factor that we found to be a barrier to CTA adoption is perceived low adoption rate ( 20 ). This barrier can be likened to the small samples hypothesis, which states that decision makers tend to select the options that result in the best payoff in a small sample ( 38 ). Specifically, the hypothesis states that people choose to not behave responsibly (e.g., not to adopt and use CTAs) because, regardless of the choices others make (whether they adopt the app or not), it is better most of the time for them (e.g., not having to be concerned with perceived government tracking, privacy issues, battery drainage, app installation space, ineffectiveness of the app due to low adoption, etc.).…”

Where is the Third E in Controlling Coronavirus Disease-19 in Indonesia? A Mini Review

“…People's refusal to comply with enforcement during emergency PPKM is the result of neglect of discipline so far. Revitalization of discipline is needed as an ecosystem of positive behavior on a wide scale [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39] through the application of a combination of three Es. If it is successfully created, Indonesia will lead to the realization of the social discipline that is very much needed to fight the spread of COVID-19 consistently even though it remains dynamic.…”

Public attitudes toward COVID-19 misbehaviors: Perceived seriousness of the misbehavior and perceived severity of the appropriate punishment

“…Reckless behaviors represent situations where people risk others’ lives and health by disregarding existing rules and laws ( Erev et al, 2020 ; Roth et al, 2020 ). COVID-19 misbehavior is a type of reckless behavior (e.g., Harris, 2020 ) because the violation of COVID-19 restrictions imposed a high cost on public health and well-being by increasing self- and others’ risk of contamination ( Ahmed et al, 2021 ).…”

“…Similar to COVID-19 misbehaviors, reckless driving and reckless sexual behavior among HIV patients represent situations in which people endanger others’ lives and health by violating laws and norms ( Erev et al, 2020 ; Roth et al, 2020 ). Drivers who disregard traffic laws (e.g., texting during driving, making an illegal turn) deviate from safe driving ( Malta, 2004 ), and place themselves and other drivers and/or their passengers at risk of physical injury or mortality ( Patil et al, 2006 ).…”