On the validity of the CNI model of moral decision-making: Reply to Baron and Goodwin (2020)

Abstract

The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).

Consequences, norms, and general action tendencies: Understanding individual differences in moral dilemma judgments.

“…Consistent with the concern that this preference score conflates multiple distinct factors, multiple regression analyses revealed systematic relations with all three parameters of the CNI model. Controlling for mere mathematical dependence, 1 preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments on traditional dilemmas has been found to be (a) positively associated with sensitivity to consequences on the C parameter, (b) negatively associated with sensitivity to moral norms on the N parameter, and (c) negatively associated with general preference for inaction versus action on the I parameter (Gawronski et al, 2020). Research by further suggests that individual differences in sensitivity to consequences and moral norms are highly stable over a period of 1 month, showing test-retest correlations that are comparable to those of the Big Five personality traits (rs = .81 and .84, respectively).…”

“…The temporal stability of general action tendencies was found to be significantly lower (r = .41). The latter finding seems partly due to the lower internal consistency of scores on the I parameter compared with the C and the N parameters (see Gawronski et al, 2020;.…”

Sensitivity to Moral Principles Predicts Both Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies in Sacrificial Dilemmas

“…Some authors have argued that people sensitive to moral principles, such as the action principle, are making an inherently deontological distinction focused on the harmful action itself (e.g., Baron & Goodwin, 2020; Bennis et al, 2010; cf. Gawronski et al, 2020). Indeed, perhaps the most well-known deontological principle “first, do no harm” directly relates to the action principle.…”

Consequences, norms, and inaction: Response to Gawronski et al. (2020)

“…Fourth, the conclusions drawn do in fact depend on the items' susceptibility to reinterpretation (owing to their ambiguity): the tests proposed for item validity are too weak, since they require only that a majority of subjects agree with the experimenters' classification, even though a minority could affect the conclusions drawn. We illustrate some of our points with an analysis of the psychopathy study of Luke and Gawronski (2020).…”

“…

In response to arguments made by Gawronski et al (2020), responding to Baron and Goodwin (2020), we concentrate on four issues. First, the CNI design requires substantial numbers of "perverse" responses to congruent items -those in which both consequences and norms both favor action, or both favor inaction -and these responses depend on the ambiguity of the items concerning which norms apply or which consequences are worse.

…”