On the uses of corporate governance provisions

Danielson, Morris G.; Karpoff, Jonathan M.

doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00012-1

Cited by 86 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Previous research has shown that the share value impacts of some takeover defenses depend on the firm's other defenses (e.g., see Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989). Also, Danielson and Karpoff (1998) and Gillan et al (2004) show that most large firms have multiple takeover defenses. Thus, the operating performance effects of a poison pill could depend on the presence of other defenses.…”

Section: Sensitivity Testsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Do pills poison operating performance?

Danielson

Karpoff

2006

Journal of Corporate Finance

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Sensitivity Testsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Do pills poison operating performance?

Danielson

Karpoff

2006

Journal of Corporate Finance

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The former category includes proposals regarding the Board of Directors, governance issues such as shareholder rights plan (poison pill) and majority voting for directors, as well as compensation issues (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998) shareholders much more frequently than Glass Lewis, at 36.0% versus 14.0% (t-statistic of the difference = 18.04). For management proposals, ISS issues negative recommendations 6.0-19.0% of the times, lower than Glass Lewis's 7.0-23.0% for each category.…”

Section: Voting and Company Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry

2018

Management Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Proxy advisory firms wield large influence with voting shareholders. However, conflicts of interest may arise when an advisor sells services to both investors and issuers. Using a unique dataset on voting recommendations, I find that for most types of proposals, competition from a new entrant reduces favoritism towards management by an incumbent advisor that serves both corporations and investors. The results are not driven by factors that influence the entrant's coverage decision, such as the marginal cost of new coverage or previously biased recommendations by the incumbent. Similar to other information intermediaries, biased advice by proxy advisors is shown to have real negative consequences, which allow management to enjoy greater private benefits. These results suggest conflicts of interest are a real concern in the proxy advisory industry, and increasing competition could help alleviate them. * I am very grateful for the guidance and support from

show abstract

“…In this respect, theoretical modeling demonstrates that the existence of complementarity means that the link between costs and gains of one practice are dependent on other practices; the adoption of one practice or group of practices may increase the marginal return in the adoption other governance practices (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990: 514;Topkis, 1998). The existing problem of governance practice selection, based on cost-benefit analysis of governance practices, must therefore also take into consideration complementarity effects in order to find possible efficient and stable equilibria (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998;Aoki, 2001;Cremers and Nair, 2005).…”

Section: Additivity and Complementarity Among Governance Practicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Doing so, this article proposes an empirical framework which is likely to bridge the gap between existing literature focused on corporate governance practices (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998;Gompers et al, 2003) and the broader neo-institutionalist literature aimed at identifying and explaining the emergence, the heterogeneity and the co-evolution of the various national governance systems and their organizational, industrial, and institutional environments (La Porta et al, 1999;Hall and Soskice, 2001;Aoki, 2001Aoki, , 2007Amable, 2003;Aoki and Jackson, 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of corporate governance practices on R&D efforts: a look at shareholders' rights, cross-listing, and control pyramid

Lhuillery¹

2011

Industrial and Corporate Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article considers the impact of multiple shareholder-oriented governance practices on R&D decisions. Based on a sample of 5528 firms belonging to 110 large French listed business groups, our results substantiate the idea that shareholder-oriented governance practices and a lower position in a control pyramid are better for R&D investment. The introduction of any additional shareholder oriented practice is found to result in more R&D. We show, however, that this Anglo-Americanization of the French corporate governance system is only partial.We provide evidence of the co-existence of an old French system of corporate governance with a hybrid model of corporate governance. The lack of concrete results on complementarity among shareholder-oriented governance practices casts doubt on the stability of this hybrid model in the French context. JEL classification: G34, O31, O32.

show abstract

On the uses of corporate governance provisions

Cited by 86 publications

References 26 publications

Do pills poison operating performance?

Do pills poison operating performance?

Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry

The impact of corporate governance practices on R&D efforts: a look at shareholders' rights, cross-listing, and control pyramid

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About