2021
DOI: 10.1007/s11019-021-10025-4
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On the use of evolutionary mismatch theories in debating human prosociality

Abstract: According to some evolutionary theorists human prosocial dispositions emerged in a context of inter-group competition and violence that made our psychology parochially prosocial, ie. cooperative towards in-groups and competitive towards strangers. This evolutionary hypothesis is sometimes employed in bioethical debates to argue that human nature and contemporary environments, and especially large-scale societies, are mismatched. In this article we caution against the use of mismatch theories in moral philosoph… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 53 publications
(47 reference statements)
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“…The grand purpose of tackling the chimera problem in the way I have, is to ask "forward-looking questions… and whether and how such dispositions can be changed… [rather than preserving concepts like 'legal persons'] that frustrate social, moral and political progress…." 125 Human exceptionalism may provide a necessary premise for human rights, but it does not provide a sufficient argument for rights in-and-of-themselves. So, it behooves us to ask about moral conditions for persons having their legal rights recognized.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The grand purpose of tackling the chimera problem in the way I have, is to ask "forward-looking questions… and whether and how such dispositions can be changed… [rather than preserving concepts like 'legal persons'] that frustrate social, moral and political progress…." 125 Human exceptionalism may provide a necessary premise for human rights, but it does not provide a sufficient argument for rights in-and-of-themselves. So, it behooves us to ask about moral conditions for persons having their legal rights recognized.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The concept of evolutionary traps has been used almost exclusively for studying how non-human species respond to cues in anthropogenic environments [24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. Key examples include artificial human lights attracting insects, island species responding naively to the presence of introduced predators, and seabirds not being able to discriminate between the cues of marine plankton and Figure 1.…”
Section: Making Sense Of Human Evolutionary Trapsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…68 In ultrasocial cultures, these relationships are codified as norms or theories of justice, but prosociality is also found in nature. 69 So, if sociality (rather than an agency) is considered necessary and sufficient for moral status, then relying on the significance of social scalability should not also commit us to species chauvinism. 70 In this respect, it is becoming less prudent to exclude at least some nonhuman species as rights holders (if you like, as "social," rather than ultrasocial animals), and, if interspecific agency is plausible it would narrow, if not collapse, the perceived moral gap between culture and nature.…”
Section: Culture and Naturementioning
confidence: 99%