On the sustainability of common property resources

Osés‐Eraso, Nuria; Viladrich-Grau, Montserrat

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2006.10.006

Cited by 50 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…disapproval by a minority of norm followers does not have much effect on the majority of norm violators, if at all). This is expressed in the relationship vð f c Þ ¼ he te g fc , where f c is the proportion of cooperators in the community at a given time ( f c ¼ n c /n), and h, t and g are parameters governing, respectively, the maximum sanctioning (asymptote), the sanctioning effectiveness threshold (displacement) and the growth rate of the function (see [34] for an example of the role of social capital for social approval).…”

Section: A Model Of Norm-driven Cooperation In the Commons (A) Socialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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Sustainable use of common-pool resources such as fish, water or forests depends on the cooperation of resource users that restrain their individual extraction to socially optimal levels. Empirical evidence has shown that under certain social and biophysical conditions, self-organized cooperation in the commons can evolve. Global change, however, may drastically alter these conditions. We assess the robustness of cooperation to environmental variability in a stylized model of a community that harvests a shared resource. Community members follow a norm of socially optimal resource extraction, which is enforced through social sanctioning. Our results indicate that both resource abundance and a small increase in resource variability can lead to collapse of cooperation observed in the no-variability case, while either scarcity or large variability have the potential to stabilize it. The combined effects of changes in amount and variability can reinforce or counteract each other depending on their size and the initial level of cooperation in the community. If two socially separate groups are ecologically connected through resource leakage, cooperation in one can destabilize the other. These findings provide insights into possible effects of global change and spatial connectivity, indicating that there is no simple answer as to their effects on cooperation and sustainable resource use.

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Section: A Model Of Norm-driven Cooperation In the Commons (A) Socialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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“…C D y y 6 5 Most evolutionary game theory models on cooperation and defection assume that effort levels chosen only depend on the behavioral mode chosen (cooperation, or defection), but not on the size of the resource stock [10][11][12][13]. In other words, effort is either "high" or "low", depending on whether an individual is a cooperator or not.…”

Section: Ph T Pqx T E T mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Building on [10][11][12][13] we use evolutionary game theory to develop a model in which a finite number of community members have access to a commonly owned renewable resource. As is the case in the real world, we assume that the common property regime is such that community members are allowed to harvest the resource, but that they are not allowed to hire non-50 community members to engage in resource harvesting too if their own time constraint is binding [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse

2013

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10Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource -but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a 15 cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation -causing the social-ecological system to collapse. 20

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“…Second, a few papers analyze the accumulation of trust through repeated interaction and improved information, facilitating cooperative behavior over time [Watson, 1999, Fafchamps 2004. Finally, cooperation may emerge as a stable Nash equilibrium in evolutionary models involving interactions across individuals, in which myopic agents replicate the behavior of more successful individuals in the community [Sethi andSomanathan, 1996, Osés-Eraso andViladrich-Grau, 2007].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identities in the Commons: The Dynamics of Norms and Social Capital

Bulte¹,

Horan²

2010

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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This paper provides a formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation in the management of common property resources. We develop a dynamic model that includes moral norms or a sense of 'identity,' and show that cooperation may -but need not -be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of intervention by a managing agency or punishment by peers. We demonstrate that outside intervention has ambiguous effects when identity matters -it may reduce welfare of the agents harvesting the stock.

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On the sustainability of common property resources

Cited by 50 publications

References 14 publications

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse

Identities in the Commons: The Dynamics of Norms and Social Capital

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