On the Study of a Single-Period Principal-Agent Model with Taxation

Wang, Huan; Huang, Wenyi

doi:10.1155/2020/5401591

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Like other studies using principal-agent theory (Assaf et al, 2020;Wang et al, 2020c;Wang and Huang, 2020), this article also considers the influence of random factors in the model.…”

Section: Research Hypothesis Based On Principal-agent Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentive Strategy of Shiftable Load Participation in Demand Response Based on User Electricity Preference

Han

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Energy Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

China has promoted the development of the new energy power generation industry since 2013. However, the high proportion of unique energy access to the grid brings greater volatility and uncertainty. One effective way to solve these problems is incentivizing shiftable loads (SLs) to demand response (DR). The low enthusiasm of SLs lies in the lack of an effective incentive mechanism and strategy. Because the SLs’ initiatives participating in the DR are closely related to its structure of comfort and economic preference, we divided SLs into economical users (EUs), standard users (SUs), and comfortable users (CUs). Considering the balance of the benefits between the load aggregator (LA) and SLs and the impact of resource scarcity, we build the optimal incentive model based on the principal-agent theory under the case of symmetry and asymmetry information. Based on MATLAB simulation, we have the following suggestions for LA: 1) In terms of dispatch sequence, LA should dispatch SUs first and then EUs and CUs, 2) In the setting of retained earnings, EUs should be the most, followed by SUs, and the least is CUs, 3) In terms of incentive intensity, CUs need the most incentive, EUs need moderate, and SUs need the least, 4) LAs need to adjust the intensity of incentive contracts according to the scarcity of resources, 5) LAs should also improve their service to reduce users’ risk aversion to strengthen their effort level.

show abstract

“…Like other studies using principal-agent theory (Assaf et al, 2020;Wang et al, 2020c;Wang and Huang, 2020), this article also considers the influence of random factors in the model.…”

Section: Research Hypothesis Based On Principal-agent Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentive Strategy of Shiftable Load Participation in Demand Response Based on User Electricity Preference

Han

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Energy Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Wang et al [38] and Liu applied a principal-agent model to study the incentive utility of governmental preference in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Wang et al [39] studied the incentive utility of tax policies by analyzing the post-event behaviors of both government and enterprises.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Incentive Contracts for Microgrid Users

Lin

2021

Energies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Tariff subsidies are beneficial to the further development of the microgrid market. In response to the reduction of the power generation costs of microgrids, the energy storage subsidy for microgrids has become a key factor affecting their further development. Therefore, it is essential to explore and establish a government subsidy mechanism for the energy storage price of microgrids. In this paper, we consider the incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints of both the government and the microgrid energy storage subsidy. The cases of hidden information and no hidden information are investigated. A microgrid energy storage subsidy model of the incentive compatibility constraint was established to analyze the efficiency of the government subsidy and the microgrid energy storage in the “self-generation + energy storage” mode. The results show that there is an adverse selection problem between the government and energy storage subsidies for microgrid users. In the case of no hidden information, the government can sign different contracts with microgrid users according to their different energy storage efficiency levels. In the case of hidden information, it is better for the government to design a menu of different incentive contracts for microgrid users with different energy storage efficiencies. This approach can ensure that microgrid users with low energy storage efficiency continue to participate in the microgrid construction. Microgrid users with high energy storage efficiency can, thus, better control their costs related to the self-generation, self-use, and surplus electricity transmitted to the grid as well as better select high-regulation carbon dioxide emission reductions and their capacity generation.

show abstract

On the Study of a Single-Period Principal-Agent Model with Taxation

Cited by 2 publications

References 18 publications

An Incentive Strategy of Shiftable Load Participation in Demand Response Based on User Electricity Preference

An Incentive Strategy of Shiftable Load Participation in Demand Response Based on User Electricity Preference

Government Incentive Contracts for Microgrid Users

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About