On the “Strength” of Behavior

Abstract

The place of the concept of response strength in a natural science of behavior has been the subject of much debate. This article reconsiders the concept of response strength for reasons linked to the foundations of a natural science of behavior. The notion of response strength is implicit in many radical behaviorists’ work. Palmer (2009) makes it explicit by applying the response strength concept to three levels: (1) overt behavior, (2) covert behavior, and (3) latent or potential behavior. We argue that the concept of response strength is superfluous in general, and an explication of the notion of giving causal status to nonobservable events like latent behavior or response strength is harmful to a scientific endeavor. Interpreting EEG recordings as indicators of changes in response strength runs the risk of reducing behavior to underlying mechanisms, regardless of whether such suggestions are accompanied by behavioral observations. Many radical behaviorists understand behavior as a discrete unit, inviting conceptual mistakes reflected in the notion of response strength. A molar view is suggested as an alternative that accounts for the temporally extended nature of behavior and avoids the perils of a response-strength based approach.

Resistance to extinction versus extinction as discrimination

“…This study adds to a growing body of evidence challenging behavioral momentum theory (e.g., Bell, 1999; Craig & Shahan, 2016; Grace et al, 1998; Reiss & Bell, 2016). Other research raises broader concerns about the usefulness of the notion of response strength itself, as a theoretical construct (e.g., Simon et al, 2020). For example, some work (e.g., Bell & Williams, 2002; Williams & Bell, 1999) has demonstrated that preference and resistance to change, two putative measures of response strength, do not necessarily covary, as Nevin and Grace (2000) claimed (Grace, 2018).…”

On Response Strength and the Concept of Response Classes

“…I have long been dismayed by the ease with which psychologists invoke explanatory fictions in the interpretation of behavior, so I find myself sympathetic with Simon et al (2020) in their insistence for conceptual clarity. I agree to this extent: the concept of response strength as a hypothetical construct plays no role in the experimental analysis of behavior, at least at our present level of technology.…”

“…Sherrington (1906), who is credited with introducing the term "synapse" (Foster & Sherrington, 1897) was aware that synapses differed in their "facility of conduction" (p. 155) and assigned them hypothetical integer values to illustrate how a sensory stimulus might be differentially allocated to various effectors. Simon et al (2020) prefer that the line between behavior and neurophysiology be kept distinct, but they embrace functional explanations at every level and suggest that we supplement our understanding of behavior by reference to evolutionary contingencies. I heartily endorse the latter proposal but not the first.…”

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Simon et al (2020) argue that the concept of response strength is unnecessary and potentially harmful in that it misdirects behavior analysts away from more fruitful molar analyses. I defend the term as a useful summary of the effects of reinforcement and point particularly to its utility as an interpretive tool in making sense of complex human behavior under multiple control.

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“…Michael (1993) proposed replacing it with frequency and relative frequency: "This usage makes it possible to avoid such controversial terms as response strength and response probability " (p. 192; emphasis in original). In this respect, at least, Simon et al (2020) are firmly on Michael's side: "Understanding response strength as an intervening variable, synonymous with response probability, would avoid the risk of reification. Then, a response's rate does not indicate its strength but instead determines it" (p. 691).…”