On the Standards of Conceptual Change

Abstract

It is a necessary condition for recognising change that there is a yardstick against which the change can be perceived. The same applies to changes that philosophical concepts undergo. This paper delineates standards for recognising conceptual change that meet the requirements of conscientious history of philosophy. More particularly, we want to argue for the need of what we will call non-textual standards. These are features of the world of experience that must be assumed to be shared between us and the historical authors we study. While they must be used in tandem with the recognised contextual standards of conceptual change, we will argue that without recourse to at least some non-textual standards, important kinds of conceptual change will remain inexplicable.

Systemic abduction: Reconstructing towards concept clarity in management studies

“…Therefore, to prevent confusion of our aim in this paper, which is how to reach construct clarity, we consider the definition of a construct as some sort of grand theory. Moreover, in the convergence theory of truth, a destined result about a matter/hypothesis is presumed in long‐run while we know that the meaning of the terms changes over time according to the historians of ideas (Kaukua & Lähteenmäki, 2019; Knight, 2012; Kuukkanen, 2008; Lovejoy, 1936, 1938; Wilson, 1987). Therefore, despite the destined truth of a theory or proposition according to the convergence theory, there is no destined true meaning of the constructs that are used in that theory or proposition.…”

“…In studying ‘the history of ideas’ (Knight, 2012; Kuukkanen, 2008; Lovejoy, 1936, 1938; Wilson, 1987), ‘unit ideas’ and ‘idea complexes’ are supposed to emerge and disappear. Historical semanticists investigate temporal changes (Kaukua & Lähteenmäki, 2019) of these unit ideas and idea complexes. For example, they may study how the meaning of ‘equality’ unit idea historically changes.…”