On the Security Properties of e-Voting Bulletin Boards

Abstract

In state-of-the-art e-voting systems, a bulletin board (BB) is a critical component for preserving election integrity and availability. Although it is common in the literature to assume that a BB is a centralized entity that is trusted, in the recent works of Culnane and Schneider [CSF 2014] and Chondros et al. [ICDCS 2016], the importance of removing BB as a single point of failure has been extensively discussed. Motivated by these works, we introduce a framework for the formal security analysis of the BB functionality. Our framework treats a secure BB as a robust public transaction ledger, defined by Garay et al. [Eurocrypt 2015], that additionally supports the generation of receipts for successful posting. Namely, in our model, a secure BB system achieves Persistence and Liveness that are confirmable, in the sense that any malicious behavior of the BB system can be detected via a verification mechanism. As a case study for our framework, we analyze the BB system of Culnane and Schneider and point out its weaknesses. We demonstrate an attack revealing that the said system does not achieve Confirmable Liveness, even in the case where the adversary is computationally bounded and covert, i.e., it may deviate from the protocol specification but does not want to be detected. In addition, we show that special care should be taken for the choice of the underlying cryptographic primitives, so that the claimed fault tolerance threshold of N/3 out-of N corrupted peers is preserved. Next, based on our analysis, we introduce a new BB protocol that upgrades the [CSF 2014] protocol. We prove that it tolerates any number less than N/3 out-of N corrupted peers both for Persistence and Confirmable Liveness, against a computationally bounded general Byzantine adversary.

A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

“…We assume that SC and the bulletin board B are honest, i.e., they are never corrupted. While SC is merely a virtual entity, in reality, B should be implemented in a distributed way (see, e.g., [11,19]). The parameter n tw denotes the number of trip wires per auditor.…”

Fifty Shades of Ballot Privacy: Privacy against a Malicious Board

“…The approach we take in this paper is to understand the level of security offered by schemes when faced with an adversary who is allowed to tamper with the bulletin board. A different approach adopted by a series of recent works [14,12,7] aims to ensure that such tampering is not possible. Technically, this is enforced via a distributed algorithm.…”

“…In particular, our mb-BPRIV definition assumes that voters all see the same board. On the other hand, [14,12,7] do not study how an attacker could tamper with the bulletin board (e.g. removing some honest ballots, reordering the ballots) and how this could affect the privacy of the voting scheme.…”

Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

“…This impossibility result can be generalised in the case of players, where the existence of more thantwo thirds of honest players is a necessary condition for consensus. Many distributed algorithms have been proposed in order to implement a Bulletin Board applicable to electronic voting scenarios (Culnane & Schneider, 2014;Kiayias et al, 2018). Recently the blockchain concept has emerged as a trust less decentralized BB implementa-tion.…”